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CHARITABLE TRUSTS-DoNOR STANDING UNDER THE UNI­
FORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr IN LIGHT OF 
CARL J. HERZOG FOUNDATION., INC V. UNIVERSITY OF 
BRIDGEPORT 
INTRODUcrION 
In the late 1960s, colleges and universities faced economic 
hardship due, in part, to inflation and low enrollments. 1 The 
problems were exacerbated because, even if an institution had en­
dowment funds or other gifts, the common law of charitable trusts 
imposed two important restrictions on their use.2 First, trustees 
were limited to a fairly conservative "prudent man" investment 
strategy.3 Second, if a charitable gift had a restriction on its use, 
and the restriction was outmoded, the institution could alter the 
terms of the restriction only by obtaining the court's permission 
through the doctrine of cy pres.4 The college or university thus had 
1. See Mary Schmid Daugherty, Commentary, Uniform Management of Institu­
tional Funds Act-The Implications for Private College Board of Regents, 57 EDUC. L. 
REP. 319, 319 (1990); infra Part 1.e.1. 
2. "The law governing the enforcement of charitable gifts is derived from the law 
of charitable trusts." Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 
995,997 n.2 (Conn. 1997) (citing 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCUIT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989)); see also Steeneck v. University 
of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 695 (Conn. 1995). 
A charitable trust is distinguished from a private trust in that the "property is de­
voted to purposes beneficial to the community." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS 
§ 1 cmt. c (1959). 
3. See Douglas M. Salaway, Note, UMIFA and a Model for Endowment Investing, 
22 J.C. & U.L. 1045, 1054 (1995-96). See infra Part I.C.l for a discussion of the prudent 
man standard and other limits on trustees. 
4. Cy pres is a common law doctrine that allows a charitable gift to be used for a 
different purpose when the original purpose cannot be executed. See Hartford Hosp. v. 
Blumenthal, No. CV-95-0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 
1996). See infra Part I.A.4 for a thorough discussion of the common law doctrine of cy 
pres through which charitable institutions can alter the terms of restricted charitable 
gifts. 
A charitable gift is a "gift for a general public use ... for the benefit of an indefi­
nite number of persons, and designed to benefit them from an educational, religious, 
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to incur litigation costs. 
Under common law, a college or university must obtain the 
court's permission to alter a gift restriction even if the donor con­
sents to changing the restriction. This is because once a gift is com­
plete, under common law, donor consent has no legal effect on the 
terms of the gift.s In addition, if the trustees of a charitable institu­
tion alter the terms of a charitable gift without obtaining the court's 
permission, only the Attorney General has standing to sue to en­
force the terms of the completed gift. The donor has no standing to 
sue unless the donor reserves a specific right to control the property 
in the gift instrument.6 
In 1969, the Ford Foundation commissioned a study to examine 
the concerns over the common law restrictions on grants to educa­
tional institutionsJ As a result of the study, in 1972, the Commis­
sioners on Uniform State Laws introduced the Uniform 
Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UMIFA") to help col­
leges and universities.s UMIFA contained two changes for charita­
ble institutions: it allowed the institutions to make riskier 
moral, physical or social standpoint." American Soc'y for Testing & Materials v. Board 
of Revision of Taxes, Philadelphia County, 225 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1967) (quoting In re 
Hill Sch., 87 A.2d 259, 262 (Pa. 1952)). 
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). 
6. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-98 (citing Marin Hosp. Dist. v. State Dep't of 
Health, 154 Cal. Rptr. 838, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v. Thompson, 266 III. App. 
165, 169 (1932)). 
A common way to retain control over property is through reserving a reversionary 
interest. A reversionary interest is a kind of forfeiture wherein the grantor "intends 
that the [body of trust] reverts to himself or his heirs if the charitable purpose is not 
served." Walton v. City of Red Bluff, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 280 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(quoting In re Mareck, 100 N.W.2d 758, 762 (Minn. 1960)). Under such conditions, the 
gift is not considered a trust, but a conditional gift. See id. Reserving some kind of 
donor control over the gift, in the gift instrument, might create tax problems for the 
donor. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 100l. 
7. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT Prefatory Note, 7A 
Part II U.L.A. 476-77 (1999), discussed infra Part I.e.l. The study was important be­
cause college trustees believed that they had a legal imperative to invest conservatively. 
See id. The study was WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE 
LORE OF ENDOWMENT FUNDS (1969). See Joel e. Dobris, Real Return, Modern Portfo­
lio Theory, and College, University, and Foundation Decisions on Annual Spending from 
Endowments: A Visit to the World ofSpending Rules, 28 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 
52 n.10 (1993). 
8. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1057-58; UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL 
FUNDS ACT, 7A Part II U.L.A. 475 (1999). 
"The committee which acted for the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws" which prepared UMIFA consisted of seven individuals who were 
lawyers and law professors from six different states. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTI­
TUTIONAL FUNDS ACT Historical Notes, 7 A Part II U.L.A. 476 (1999). 
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investments for higher returns and created an easier way to release 
restrictions on charitable gifts.9 
In 1973, the Connecticut legislature passed the Connecticut 
Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act ("CUMIFA").1° 
Closely replicating UMIFA,ll CUMIFA's adoption reflected Con­
necticut's growing concern over the financial health of its colleges 
and universities,12 Like UMIFA, the law created two important 
changes for charitable institutions. First, it allows trustees of chari­
table institutions, including colleges and universities, to place the 
money from their endowments in investments that will produce a 
high return.13 Second, it provides trustees with a mechanism for 
changing restrictions on gifts: donor consent or, in the absence of a 
donor, court approval.14 
In 1991, the University of Bridgeport altered the terms of a 
donor's completed, but restricted, gift without obtaining either the 
consent of the available donor or the court, in violation of section 
45a-533 of CUMIFA.15 The donor sued to enforce the restrictions 
on the gift,16 In Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of 
Bridgeportp the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the ques­
tion of whether CUMIFA created a donor interest in the charitable 
gift itself, thus granting the donor standing to sue. IS The court, in a 
3-2 decision, held that the donor had no standing to sue under 
9. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer Prefatory Note, 7A 
Part II U.L.A. 476-77 (1999), discussed infra Part I.C.1. 
10. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-526 to -534 (1997). 
11. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer, 7A PART II U.L.A. 
475 (1999). Connecticut added sections 45a-529a and 45a-529b to its version of 
UMIFA. The issue in this Note, however, focuses on section 45a-533, which codifies 
section 7 of UMIFA. 
12. See 16 H.R. Proc., Pt. 11, 1973 Sess., at 5723 (Conn.) [hereinafter House Pro­
ceeding]; Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 1, 1973 Sess., at 337 
[hereinafter UMIFA Hearing]. 
13. See UMIFA Hearing, supra note 12, at 337; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§§ 45a-526 to -532 (1997); Dobris, supra note 7, at 51-52. 
14. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a)-(b) (1997); infra Parts II-III. 
15. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 
(Conn. 1997). 
16. See id. 
17. 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
18. See id. at 999. The appeallate court and the trial court also focused on 
whether CUMIFA created a donor interest in the gift itself. See Carl J. Herzog Found., 
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381-82 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Carl J. 
Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL 
128255, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995). 
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CUMIFA.19 The majority held that because CUMIFA does not ex­
plicitly state that the donor may sue to enforce CUMIFA's provi­
sions, no interest was created in the donor, and the common law of 
charitable trusts applied to the issue of standing.20 The dissent in 
the case endorsed the reasoning of the appellate court, which stated 
that section 45a-533 of CUMIFA created an interest in the gift 
which conferred donor standing to sue when the University of 
Bridgeport violated CUMIFA's requirements.21 
The Herzog decision is important for two reasons.22 First, this 
is the first decision of any state court concerning standing under 
CUMIFA's model, UMIFA, a uniform law adopted by at least 
forty-four states and the District of Columbia.23 As such, other 
courts might look to this decision for guidance.24 Second, the Con­
necticut court's decision to deny donor standing under CUMIFA 
may have a far reaching effect on charitable donations to universi­
ties. As noted by the dissent in Herzog, the majority's decision may 
result in donors being more reluctant to contribute to charitable 
institutions when they realize that they will have no standing to sue 
if their gift restrictions are ignored.25 
This Note discusses the interpretation of donor standing under 
19. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002; see also Jonathan Rabinovitz, Court Says Col­
lege Donors Cannot Sue Over Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1997, at B1. 
20. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002. 
21. See id. at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). The appellate court said that one 
could imply standing from the section of the statute requiring the donor's written con­
sent for the release of gift restrictions. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1385. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court treated the issue as a question of a property interest in the gift. See 
Herzog, 699 A.2d at 999. The appellate court was less clear about what the interest was, 
but, in part, treated the interest as the donor's right to require the donee to obtain its 
written consent for alterations of a completed gift. The appellate court also said that 
the donor could withhold consent. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381-82. 
22. The New York Times covered the decision twice. See Karen W. Arenson, 
Spending It; Making Those Good Causes Do What the Donor Intended, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 1997, § 3, at 10; Rabinovitz, supra note 19. 
23. As of 1999, the only states which had not adopted a version of UMIFA were 
Alaska, Arizona, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See UNIF. MANAGE­
MENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr, 7A Part II U.L.A. 475-76 (1999); see also 
Salaway, supra note 3, at 1048. 
24. Connecticut courts are already citing this case as they consider donor standing 
to sue, even though cases are not specifically being brought under CUMIFA. See, e.g., 
Russell v. Yale Univ., No. CV-97-0400425-S, 1997 WL 809974, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 31, 1997) (holding that under the principles established in Herzog, donor had no 
standing to sue). 
25. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). See infra notes 276­
78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the fact that one practitioner has advised 
estate planners to take the Herzog decision into account and create protection for do­
nors in the gift instrument. 
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CUMIFA by both the Connecticut Supreme Court in Herzog and 
the Connecticut Appellate Court it overruled. Part I describes the 
background information necessary to understand the issue raised in 
the case. It discusses the common law of charitable trusts, the tax 
implications for charitable gifts, the historic context in which 
CUMIFA was proposed, including its legislative history, and stand­
ing doctrine as it is applied in Connecticut. Part II presents the 
reasoning of the trial and appellate courts, as well as the Connecti­
cut Supreme Court's majority and dissenting opinions in Herzog.26 
Part III suggests that while CUMIFA created a legally protected 
interest for donors, it was not an interest in the charitable gift itself, 
as assumed by the Connecticut courts, but rather, an interest in a 
particular process which CUMIFA requires to alter the terms of a 
charitable gift. Relying on the United States Supreme Court deci­
sions of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,27 Bennett v. Spear,28 and 
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & 
Trust CO.,29 Part III argues that once a court recasts the right that 
CUMIFA created in the donor as a right to a process, injury is ap­
parent and standing should be allowed. Part III also suggests that 
casting the right created in the donor under CUMIFA as the right 
to a process answers the concerns about donor standing which were 
raised by the Connecticut courts' interpretations of CUMIFA in 
Herzog.3o 
I. CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE ORIGINS OF CUMIFA, AND 

STANDING IN CONNECTICUT 

A. 	 Common Law of Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of 
Cy Pres 
1. Creating a Charitable Trust 
Charitable gifts are governed by the law of charitable trustS.31 
26. Since the dissent in the case is very brief and simply endorsed the reasoning of 
the appellate court, an analysis of the legal reasoning in the case necessarily involves 
use of the appellate court decision. 
27. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
28. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
29. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998). 
30. One concern the Connecticut Supreme Court expressed was tax implications 
if donors controlled their charitable gifts. See infra Parts II-III for a complete discus­
sion of the concerns of the Connecticut courts. 
31. "The law governing the enforcement of charitable gifts is derived from the 
law of charitable trusts." Carl I. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 
A.2d 995, 997 n.2 (Conn. 1997) (citing 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN Scorr & WILLIAM 
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A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship whereby the person 
who holds charitable property or gifts has a duty to use the property 
for charitable purposes.32 A charitable trust is created when a do­
nor manifests an intention to create such a trust and subjects the 
donee to a duty to use the trust for charitable purposes.33 It is not 
the intention of the donor, but rather the purpose to which the 
property is put, which determines whether a trust has been cre­
ated.34 The donor of property may either give the property to trust­
ees to be held for charitable purposes or "transfer[] it to a 
charitable corporation."35 If the donor makes a gift to a charitable 
corporation, he may make it with or without restrictions on the use 
of the gift.36 The charitable corporation must observe any restric­
tions on the gift.37 
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348.1 (4th ed. 1989»; see also Steeneck v. 
University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 695 (Conn. 1995). 
32. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997 n.2. A charitable gift is a gift given to the public 
where the beneficiaries are not defined. See 4A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM 
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 348, at 32 (4th ed. 1989); see also Herzog, 
699 A.2d at 997 n.2 (citing Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (App. Div. 
1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959». See supra note 4 for a more 
detailed definition of charitable gift. 
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 (1959). "A charitable trust is a 
fiduciary relationship with respect to property arising as a result of a manifestation of 
an intention to create it, and subjecting the person by whom the property is held to 
equitable duties to deal with the property for a charitable purpose." Id. 
34. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348, at 6. 
35. 4A id. § 348, at 8; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. c 
(1959). 
36. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348.1, at 8-9; see also RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959). A charitable gift may be made 
without any restrictions, in which case it may be used by the corporation in 
such manner as it sees fit for the accomplishment of any of the purposes for 
which it exists; or the gift may be restricted to the accomplishment of one of 
the purposes for which the corporation exists; or it may be provided that the 
corporation may devote the income to any of its purposes or to a particular 
purpose, but shall not expend the principal. 
4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348.1, at 9. 
A donor simply writing out a check to "X College" would be an example of the 
first kind of charitable gift. A donor who had a gift instrument requiring that its dona­
tion be earmarked for scholarships for medical related degrees would be an example of 
the second kind of gift. A donor whose gift instrument instructs that only the income 
from the principal he is giving can be used for medical related degrees would be an 
example of the third kind of gift. Where appropriate, Part I of this Note will build on 
this example of gift restrictions. 
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959) (stating that the 
Attorney General will sue to enforce gift restrictions). The enforcement of gifts by the 
Attorney General is discussed infra Part I.A.2. 
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2. Revoking, Modifying, and Enforcing Charitable Trusts 
If a donor creates a completed charitable gift, even one con­
taining restrictions on its use, the donor loses control over the gift's 
disposition.38 This is because when a donor makes a charitable gift, 
the beneficiary is not an individual, but the community.39 However, 
a donor may modify or revoke a gift under two conditions: if the 
donor has "reserved such a power, or if the omission to reserve 
such power is due to a mistake. "40 In addition, unless a right to the 
gift itself is reserved in the gift instrument, the terms of a charitable 
gift can be enforced in only three ways: by the Attorney General or 
other public official, by another trustee of the charitable trust, or by 
someone who has a special interest.41 
The reason the Attorney General is charged with enforcing the 
trust is because the Attorney General is the legal representative of 
the community in the matter.42 The Attorney General may initiate 
the suit himself or may bring suit "on relation of a third person ... 
[who] need not have any direct interest in the enforcement of the 
trust."43 If the suit is brought at the request of the third party, the 
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). 
39. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 348, at 8. 
40. 4A id. § 367, at 113; see also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 367 
(1959). Building upon the example of the donor's gift to a college for scholarships for 
medical related degrees, unless the instrument explicitly stated that the donor retained 
the right to the gift, the donor cannot redress any violation of the restrictions on the 
gift. There have been exceptions, however. In New York, a university's alumni associa­
tion which gave a professorship to an educational institution reserved the power to 
nominate the professor. The association was allowed to sue to enforce the terms of the 
gift. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 376 (citing Association 
Alumni v. Theological Seminary, 57 N.E. 626 (N.Y. 1900». 
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). Section 391 states the 
following: 
A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the At­
torney General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who 
has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by 
persons who have no special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal 
representatives or next of kin. 
Id. 
42. See 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 357-59. The tradition of 
the Attorney General's office protecting the public has its roots in British history. It is 
based on the idea of the monarch as parent (parens patriae) with a duty to protect his 
subjects. In the United States the parens patriae is the state, and it is the Attorney 
General who acts for the state. See Mary Grace Blasko et aI., Standing to Sue in the 
Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 40 (1993). 
43. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 359. A "relator" is someone 
who is allowed to "institute a proceeding in the name of the People or the attorney 
general when the right to sue resides solely in that official." GEORGE GLEASON Bo­
GERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 411, at 7 n.16 (2d ed. 
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third party "is liable for costs which would otherwise have to be 
paid by the state."44 In addition, if a person has no special interest 
in the enforcement of a trust, he "cannot maintain a proceeding, by 
mandamus or otherwise, to compel the Attorney General to bring 
an [enforcement] action."45 The latter rule exists to reduce the like­
lihood of charities having to contend with harassing litigation.46 
A co-trustee also may bring suit to enforce the terms of a chari­
table truSt.47 The suit may be an action to "compel the redress of a 
breach of trust. "48 In such suits, the Attorney General must be 
joined as a party to the action.49 
Individuals with a special interest also can sue to enforce the 
terms of a trust. 50 Although a charitable trust does not name an 
individual beneficiary, an individual who can show that he is enti­
tled to receive a benefit from the trust "which is not merely the 
benefit ... which the ... general public" receives from the trust, has 
a special interest and may sue.51 For example, if a charitable trust is 
given for education, and if a particular individual is entitled to pref­
erence under the trust, he may file suit to receive the benefit.52 The 
person with the special interest must join the Attorney General in 
the suit so that the Attorney General may protect the public inter­
est.53 If the community is not affected by the outcome of the suit, 
the person does not have to join the Attorney General.54 
3. 'Tax Implications for Charitable Donations 
If a donor reserves the right to enforce the terms of a charita­
ble trust, he may face tax implications. Section 170 of the Internal 
Revenue Code concerns tax deductions for charitable donations to 
1991) (quoting Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 943 (1959»; see also Blasko et aI., supra note 42, at 49. 
44. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 359; see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a (1959). 
45. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 361. 
46. See 4A id. § 391, at 373; see also Blasko et aI., supra note 42, at 42. 
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959). 
48. 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 365. 
49. See 4A id. The Attorney General must be joined when the suit is brought by 
the trustee "for the construction of the instrument creating it, or to determine its valid­
ity, or where a suit is brought by others to invalidate a charitable trust." 4A id. 
50. See 4A id. § 391, at 366. 
51. 4A id. 
52. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c (1959). 
53. See 4A SC01T & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 391, at 369. 
54. See 4A id. § 391, at 370. 
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charitable institutions. 55 Charitable institutions' include orgarnza­
tions such as churches, educational institutions, hospitals, and foun­
dations.56 For federal income tax purposes, an individual who 
donates to a charitable organization is allowed to deduct the 
amount from his adjusted gross income.57 However, a gift which 
has a condition precedent cannot be taken as a deduction until the 
condition is met.58 A condition precedent on a gift would be a con­
dition that had to be met in order for the gift to vest in the donee.59 
In addition, if a donor is giving a gift of property rather than cash, 
the donor must "part with dominion and control over the property" 
and must not "retain incidents of control," in order to receive a tax 
deduction under section 170.60 Finally, donors are allowed to de­
duct gifts of partial interest in property or in trust if the terms of the 
gift meet the exceptions contained in section 170(f)(3).61 
55. See LR.C. § 170 (West Supp. 1998). 
56. See id. § 170(b)(I)(A)(i)-(viii). 
57. See Barbara L. Kirschten & Carla A. Neeley, Charitable Contributions: In­
come Tax Aspects, 521 Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-I (1993). There are limits on the 
amount one can deduct from adjusted gross income. See id.; see also LR.C. 
§ 170(b)(I)(A)(viii), 170(b)(I)(B). 
There are five elements which make up a charitable contribution under section 170: 
"(1) a transfer of, (2) money or property, (3) to a permissible donee, (4) that is both 
voluntary and without receipt of economic consideration or benefit, and (5) that is in 
the proper form." Kirschten & Neeley, supra, at A-2. If the gift is conditional, and 
"may be defeated upon the happening of a condition subsequent, [IRS] Regs. 
§ 1.170(A)-I(e) ... [allows a deduction] if the occurrence of the conditioned event 
'appears on the date of the gift to be so remote as to be negligible.'" Id. at A-4. 
58. See Kirschten & Neeley, supra note 57, at A-4. 
59. See id. 
60. Id. at A-8. 
61. See id. at A-38. The exceptions for partial interest in property arise when: (1) 
the partial interest in property is the donor's entire interest, (2) the donor gives an 
undivided portion of the donor's entire interest, (3) the donation is a remainder interest 
in a personal residence or farm, (4) the donation is a qualified contribution for conser­
vation purposes (e.g., preserving land or open space, historic sites), (5) the donation is a 
future interest in personal property, (6) if the partial interest would be deductible if 
transferred in trust, and (7) if the donor's retained interest is not substantial. See id. at 
A-38 to A-47. "The test [for insubstantial interest] is whether the interest retained by 
the donor is so insubstantial that the donor has in substance transferred his entire inter­
est." Id. at A-47. 
A contribution in trust can be given by splitting the trust between charitable and 
non-charitable beneficiaries. See id. at A-47 to A-57. The deduction in such circum­
stances is allowed only if the remainder interest of the trust is in one of the following 
forms: (1) charitable remainder annuity trust, (2) charitable remainder unitrust, or (3) 
pooled income fund. See Bonnie Brier & Jennifer J. Knauer, Charitable Remainder 
Trusts and Pooled Income Funds, 435-2nd Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1995). 
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4. Cy Pres 
Cy pres is a doctrine which allows the court to alter a charita­
ble gift when the gift's specific terms cannot be fulfilled.62 The doc­
trine applies only to charitable trusts and corporations.63 It is 
applied when the donor has not reserved a right of control over the 
charitable trust and the fulfillment of the terms of the trust becomes 
"impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out. "64 Equity will 
not allow a charitable trust to fail,65 and the court will try to apply 
the trust to "some other charitable purpose that falls within the 
general charitable intention of the settlor."66 Since the donor's con­
trol ends at the time the trust is created, the court does not have to 
take into consideration the donor's wishes while he is living, 
although the court "undoubtedly" wil1.67 Generally, state law de­
termines whether a court will apply cy pres to the trust at issue.68 
62. See Andrew C. Kruger, Note, Are Charitable Trusts and the Doctrine of Cy 
Pres Alive After Yale University v. Blumenthal?, 8 CONN. PROB. L.J. 241, 248 nn.43 & 
45 (1994). Cy pres comes from the phrase in Norman French cy pres comme possible, 
which means "as near as possible." See In re Estate of Buck, No. 23259 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 15, 1986), reprinted in 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 691, 747 (1987) (citing BOGERT & Bo· 
GERT, supra note 43, § 431, at 490). The doctrine of cy pres is set out in the RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959). The text is as follows: 
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, 
and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the 
particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to 
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court 
will direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which 
falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor. 
[d. 
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959). 
64. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118. Some examples of 
when a charitable trust can fail are when the amount given is insufficient to accomplish 
the purpose, the particular purpose is already accomplished, lack of consent, the pur­
pose has no value to the community, or illegality. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 399 cmts. jon (1959). 
65. See Kruger, supra note 62, at 251. This is because, at least in Connecticut, the 
courts assume that the "donor would attach so much more importance to the object of 
the gift than to the mechanism." /d. (quoting Briggs v. Merchants Nat'! Bank, 81 
N.E.2d 827, 834 (Mass. 1948». 
66. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118; see also RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. d (1959). 
A settlor is a donor or person who creates a trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 3 (1959). Just because a trust fails does not mean that the court will find that 
the donor had a general charitable intent. In Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), 
property which was conveyed in a will to the city of Macon, Georgia to create a whites­
only park was allowed to fail because there was no general charitable intent. See id. at 
441-43; see also Kruger, supra note 62, at 252. 
67. 4A SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 32, § 367.2, at 118. 
68. See Kruger, supra note 62, at 252. Connecticut applies a three part test when 
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The trustees of the charitable trust are not allowed to decide 
whether or not to devote the property of the failed trust to some 
other general charitable purpose, even if that purpose falls within 
the intent of the donor.69 Instead, the trustees must apply to the 
court for a determination of the donor's charitable intention; thus, 
the court decides where to apply the failed trust.1o If the trustees 
do not apply for court approval, they "are subject to liability for 
breach of truSt."71 
B. Standing Under Connecticut Law 
In order to commence a lawsuit, a plaintiff must be a proper 
party to bring the suit; this is known as standing.72 According to the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, standing is a "practical concept 
designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits 
brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial deci­
sions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot contro­
versy with each view fairly and vigorously represented. "73 Courts 
decide that the requirements of justiciability and controversy are 
"met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of direct injury 
he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representa­
tive capacity."74 A plaintiff cannot have standing "unless he has ... 
some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable 
deciding whether to apply cy pres: (1) the trust must have a charitable purpose, (2) the 
specific charitable purpose must be "impossible, impracticable, or illegal," and (3) "the 
settlor must have manifested a general" charitable intent. Hartford Hosp. v. Blumen­
thal, No. CV-95-0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 15, 1996). 
The third part of the test is interpreted to mean that the actual organization to which 
the donation is made is secondary to the general charitable intent. See id. 
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. e (1959). 
70. See id. 
71. Id. The court can, however, retroactively approve the action of the trustees 
"as though the court had authorized the application [of the failed gift] before it was 
made." Id. Cy Pres is addressed in section 45a-533(d) of the General Statutes of Con­
necticut. See infra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533(d). 
72. See Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869, 871 (Conn. 1985). 
73. Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law v. 
Board of Trustees, Univ. of Conn., 673 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1996) (citing Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 332 A.2d 78, 80 (Conn. 1973); Maloney v. 
Pac, 439 A.2d 349, 354 (Conn. 1981». In the Gay & Lesbian Law Students case, the 
University of Connecticut law school's gay and lesbian student organization sought a 
permanent injunction to prevent the school from permitting the military to recruit on 
campus. See id. at 486-87. The court granted the organization standing to sue based on 
a Connecticut statute which prohibits discrimination against homosexuals. See id. 491­
92. 
74. Id. at 490 (citing Maloney, 439 A.2d at 354). 
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right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy."75 
One must merely allege injury or "attempt to vindicate 'arguably' 
protected interests" in order to have standing.76 
When a claim arises by operation of a statute, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court uses a two part "aggrievement" test to determine 
whether a plaintiff has a statutory right to sue.77 First, the plaintiff 
"must successfully demonstrate a specific personal and legal inter­
est in the subject matter."78 Second, following the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,79 the 
plaintiff must show that he has been injured and that the injury 
75. Id. at 491 (quoting Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 652 A.2d 489 (Conn. 
1994». 
76. Id. at 491 (quoting Maloney, 439 A.2d at 354 n.6 (citing Ducharme v. Putnam, 
285 A.2d 318, 320 (Conn. 1971); Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970))). 
In federal cases, the requirement to show injury is the first of three factors that a 
plaintiff must satisfy in order to have standing under Article Ill's case and controversy 
provision. See Valley Forge Christian College V. Americans United for the Separation 
of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982). The other factors of the test are that 
the defendant must have caused the injury and that the court must be able to redress 
the injury. See id. See infra note 79 and accompanying text for a full discussion of this 
test as outlined in Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
77. Med-Trans of Conn., Inc. V. Department of Pub. Health and Addiction Servs., 
699 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1997). 
78. Id. A specific interest must be more than a general interest. A general inter­
est is an interest which "is the concern of all members of the community as a whole." 
Id. at 146 (quoting United Cable Television Servs. Corp. V. Department of Pub. Util. 
Control, 663 A.2d 1011, 1017 (Conn. 1995». 
79. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the University 
of Connecticut School of Law V. Board of Trustees, University of Connecticut, 673 A.2d 
484 (Conn. 1996), the Connecticut Supreme Court endorsed the standing analysis con­
tained in Lujan, stating "[t]here is little material difference between what we have re­
quired and what the United States Supreme Court ... demanded of the plaintiff to 
establish standing." Id. at 4~1 n.lO. 
Lujan added to a line of United States Supreme Court cases about standing and 
contained a three prong test. First, the complainant must demonstrate an "injury in 
fact." This means that the plaintiff must have a "concrete and particularized [injury] ... 
[which is] actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560­
61. Second, the injury must be caused by the defendant's actions, rather than by an­
other party. See id. Third, it must be likely, rather than speCUlative, that a favorable 
decision will grant relief from the injury. See id. at 561; see also Gay & Lesbian Law 
Students, 673 A.2d at 490-91; Charles D. Kelso & R. Randall Kelso, Standing to Sue: 
Transformations in Supreme Court Methodology, Doctrine and Results, 28 U. ToL. L. 
REv. 93, 97-148 (1996) (arguing that Supreme Court's standing doctrine can be under­
stood as reflecting changes in Court personnel and decision making styles of Justices). 
See generally Allen V. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (articulating, for the first time, 
the three prong test for standing); Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 489-90 
(denying taxpayer standing). 
'!\vo recent Supreme Court cases which discuss standing under operation of a stat­
ute, Bennett V. Spear, 504 U.S. 154 (1997), and National Credit Union Administration V. 
143 1999] DONOR STANDING UNDER UMIFA 
"falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the stat­
utory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for [the] com­
plaint."80 The zone of interests portion of the aggrievement test is 
part of standing, which is a "set of prudential principles" the judici­
ary uses to limit its power to hear cases.81 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court looks to the language of the statute and to legisla­
tive intent to define the zone of interests.82 
Courts may confer standing on a plaintiff when the statute does 
not explicitly grant a right to sue; this is known as a statutory im­
plied private right of action.83 Connecticut courts use implied pri-
First National Bank & Trust Company, 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998), are discussed in detail 
infra Part III. 
80. Med-Trans, 699 A.2d at 146 (quoting United Cable Television, 663 A.2d at 
1018 (quoting Air Courier Conference v. Postal Workers, 498 U.S. 517, 523 (1991) (cit­
ing Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 873 (1990»». In Med-Trans, the 
Connecticut Public Health and Addiction Services department decided to grant a li­
cense to an emergency ambulance service. Another ambulance service which, until 
then, had a monopoly on the service, appealed the decision. The court held that the 
claimant ambulance service lacked standing under the licensing statute because it did 
not fall within the zone of interests protected by the statute. See id. at 147-51. 
The zone of interests component of standing analysis was articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (finding that Congress did not intend to allow suit by 
every person suffering injury in fact when it passed the Administration Procedure Act). 
See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Association of Data 
Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970»; Mary A. Renfer & Douglas 
C. Smith, Note, Kapiolani Park Preservation Society V. City and County of Honolulu: 
The Lease of Public Park Land as a Breach of a Charitable Trust, 11 U. HAw. L. REv. 
199,213-14 (1989) (discussing requirements of standing). 
81. Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 474. Under prudential standing, 
even if a plaintiff can show injury caused by actions of the defendant, which are 
redressable in court, standing may be denied under certain conditions. First, the plain­
tiff must be asserting his own legal rights or interests rather than those of third parties. 
Second, even if the plaintiff has a redressable injury, the court will not hear a case if the 
injury is based on an abstract question or an issue that is better addressed by the other 
branches of government. Third, the plaintiff's "complaint [must] fall within.'the zone of 
interests [that are] protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee.'" 
Id. at 475 (quoting Association of Data Processing Servs., 397 U.S. at 153); see also 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988) (arguing that 
the standing doctrine should be abandoned in favor of deciding standing on the merits 
of plaintiff's claim); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? of Citizen Suits, 
"Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (critiquing current conceptions 
of standing doctrine); Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79; Renfer & Smith, supra note 80. 
82. See Med-Trans, 699 A.2d at 149-50. See supra Part I.C and infra Parts II-III 
for a discussion of the fact that there is no legislative history to CUMIFA that explicitly 
covers donor standing under the statute. See infra Part III.B.3 for a discussion of Na­
tional Credit Union Administration V. First National Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 927 
(1998), where the Supreme Court rejected the search for legislative intent in the zone of 
interests analysis. 
83. In Bennett V. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), the Supreme Court stated that the 
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vate rights of action as part of their analysis of the statutory right to 
sue.84 In Mead v. Burns,85 for example, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court found an implied private right of action under the Connecti­
cut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA").86 "[S]everal factors 
are relevant" in determining whether a private right of action can 
be implied under a statute.87 These factors are derived from a test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash.88 
First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose . . . benefit the 
statute was enacted ... ? Second, is there any indication of legis­
zone of interests analysis is part of standing analysis unless Congress expressly forbids it 
in the statute. See id. at 163. Bennett is discussed fully infra Part III. 
When a statute explicitly grants standing to particular individuals, this is also 
known as conferring a private right of action. The focus of this Note is a statute which 
does not explicitly do so. C/. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 404 
U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (finding implied private right of action under section 1O(b)-5 of the 
Securities Exchange Act ("SEA") of 1934,15 U.S.c. § 78j(b) (1994), when fraud is used 
in sale or purchase of securities); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964) (im­
plying a private right of action under section 14(a) of the SEA, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) 
(1994), because SEA implies availability of judicial relief to achieve the purpose of the 
statute). This is sometimes known as the private attorney general. See Bennett, 520 
U.S. at 165. However, many courts use the term "private attorney general" when they 
are discussing whether or not the plaintiff will be awarded attorney's fees. See, e.g., 
Doe v. Heintz, 526 A.2d 1318, 1322 (Conn. 1987). 
84. See, e.g., Napoletano v. Cigna He~lthcare, Inc., 680 A.2d 127, 145 (Conn. 
1996); Mead v. Bums, 509 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1986); Town of Willington v. Regional Bd. of 
Educ., No. CV-95-57652-S, 1997 WL 663100, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1997). 
85. 509 A.2d 11 (Conn. 1986). 
86. See id. at 18. 
87. Town o/Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *4 (quoting Napoletano, 680 A.2d at 
145). 
In Town 0/ Willington, in 1993, the town joined a regional school district estab­
lished by two other towns, Ashford and Mansfield. See id. at *1. Willington paid the 
school district to educate its students. See id. at *2. At the end of the 1993-94 fiscal 
year, the school had a surplus in its budget and the regional board of education voted to 
return the money to the budgets of Ashford and Mansfield. See id. The Town of Wil­
lington sued, claiming that the decision to return the surplus money to the other two 
towns violated section 10-51(c) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, which said that 
any surplus should be applied to the next year's school budget. See id. at *3. Among 
other things, the defendants claimed that Willington did not have a private right of 
action under section 1O-51(c). See id. The Connecticut court applied the three factors 
derived from Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), and denied a cause of action to Wil­
lington. See Town 0/ Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *4-6. 
88. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the stockholders of the Bethlehem Steel Corpo­
ration tried to get an injunction against the corporate directors who were using corpo­
rate funds to pay for advertisements in the 1972 presidential election. Although he was 
not mentioned by name, the ads targeted Senator George McGovern, the nominee for 
the Democratic party. The stockholders argued that 18 U.S.c. § 610, which prohibited 
corporations from making contributions and expenditures to federal elections, gave 
them an implied private right of action to sue to stop the funding of the advertisements. 
The court disagreed and found no implied private right of action. See id. 
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lative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or 
to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying pur­
poses of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the 
plaintiff?89 
C. 	 The Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act 
("UMIFA") and the Connecticut Uniform Management 
of Institutional Funds Act ("CUMIFA") 
1. 	 Purpose of UMIFA and CUMIFA 
UMIFA and CUMIFA were designed to bring changes to the 
common law governing charitable institutions.90 The drafters of 
UMIFA considered changes necessary because, traditionally, col­
leges and universities had relied on funds generated from the in­
vestment of endowment funds to supplement the money they 
received from tuition.91 The college or university had to go to court 
if it wanted to change a gift restriction.92 
Largely as a result of a 19th century Massachusetts case,93 
courts held trustees of charitable institutions to a "prudent man" 
standard when they invested endowment funds.94 Through subse­
quent decisions, courts narrowed the rule to a very stringent stan­
89. Napoletano, 680 A.2d at 144-45 (quoting Cart, 422 U.S. at 78) (alterations in 
original); see also Town of Willington, 1997 WL 663100, at *3. 
90. The titles of the sections of CUMIFA are as follows: 





45a-528. Expenditure of net appreciation, standards. 

45a-529. Exception and restriction on expenditure of net appreciation. 

Construction. 
45a-529a. Accumulation of annual net income, standards. 
45a-529b. Exception and restriction on accumulation of annual net income. 
Construction. 
45a-530. Investment of institutional funds. 
45a-531. Delegation of powers of investment. 
45a-532. Standards applicable to actions of governing board. 
45a-533. Release of restriction in gift instrument: Written consent, court order. 
Limitations. Doctrine of cy pres applicable. 
45a-534. Construction. 
See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-526 to -534 (1997). 
91. 	 See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1045-46. 
92. See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of cy pres, the common law process for 
changing restrictions on charitable gifts. 
93. 	 See Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). 
94. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1053 (citing Harvard College v. Amory, 26 
Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830)). The "prudent man" standard meant that while trustees 
could invest funds, they could not do so speculatively, but had to consider "the prob­
able income, as well as the probable safety of the capital to be invested." Id. at 1054. If 
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dard which "hampered the investment choices of trustees."95 As a 
result, trustees followed a conservative strategy, investing in "safe" 
government bonds, and high dividend stocks rather than growth 
stocks.96 
The investment strategy worked until the late 1960s, when in­
flation, low enrollment, and a drop in the stock market caused col­
leges to suffer financially.97 In the late 1960s, the Ford Foundation 
commissioned a study "to examine the legal restrictions on the 
powers of trustees ... of colleges and universities to invest endow­
ment funds to achieve growth, to maintain purchasing power, and 
to expend a prudent portion of appreciation in endowment funds. 
They concluded that . . . the legal impediments . . . [were] more 
legendary than real."98 As a result of the study, the Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws introduced UMIFA in 1972.99 
The purpose of UMIFA was to allow trustees of charitable in­
stitutions, including colleges and universities, to invest more liber­
ally in order to obtain higher yields. UMIFA offered a trustee 
(1) a standard of prudent use of appreciation in invested funds; 
(2) specific investment authority; (3) authority to delegate invest­
ment decisions; (4) a standard of business care and prudence to 
guide governing boards in the exercise of their duties under the 
Act; and (5) a method of releasing restrictions on the use of 
funds or selection of investments by donor acquiescence or court 
action.lOO 
What UMIFA has meant in practice is that the standard of care for 
the trustees is less stringent than before, going from prudent man to 
business prudence, and colleges and universities are now more free 
to choose higher risk investments with higher returns.lOl In addi­
the trustee did not invest prudently, the trustee was liable for breach of trust. See 
Daugherty, supra note 1, at 322. 
95. Salaway, supra note 3, at 1054. 
96. See id. Institutions would spend the money from the income on the endow­
ment but leave the principal intact. See id. 
97. See Daugherty, supra note 1, at 319. 
98. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A Part 
II U.L.A. 477 (1999). 
99. See Sal away, supra note 3, at 1057. See supra note 23 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of which states have adopted UMIFA. 
100. UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A 
Part II U.L.A. 476 (1999). 
101. See Salaway, supra note 3, at 1056. Some examples of the new kinds of 
investments are venture capital, derivatives, and hedge funds. See id. at 1046. 
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tion, it offers trustees a mechanism for altering gift restrictions with­
out having to incur court costs. 
2. Section 45a-533 of CUMIFA (Section 7 of UMIFA) 
In 1973, Connecticut adopted CUMIFA, its version of UMIFA. 
CUMIFA provides charitable institutions with a scheme for altering 
restrictions on gifts through section 45a-533.102 Section 45a-533 
does not explicitly confer a right to sue to enforce gift restrictions 
on donors. Section 45a-533(a) states that a restriction on a gift may 
be altered by "the written consent of the donor."lo3 Section 45a­
533(b) provides for a judicial ruling on the restriction if the donor is 
dead, disabled, unavailable, or impossible to identify.l04 Section 
45a-533( c) states that releases from restrictions will be allowed only 
if the money is to be used for educational or other charitable pur­
poses. lOS Section45a-533(d) states that sections (a) through (c) do 
not limit the application of cy pres.106 Accordingly, the court may 
determine the intent of the donor and require that the money be 
spent in close approximation to that intent.107 
Although section 45a-533 does not confer donor standing to 
sue, the language of section 45a-533(a) significantly alters the com­
102. Section 4Sa-S33 of CUMIFA is identical to section 7 of UMIFA. The text of 
section 4Sa-S33 is as follows: 
(a) With the written consent of the donor, the governing board may release, in 
whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the 
use or investment of an institutional fund. 
(b) If written consent of the donor cannot be obtained by reason of his death, 
disability, unavailability or impossibility of identification, the governing board 
may apply, in the name of the institution, to the Superior Court for a judicial 
district in which the institution conducts its affairs for release of a restriction 
imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the use or investment of an insti­
tutional fund. The Attorney General shall be notified of the application and 
shall be given an opportunity to be heard. If the court finds that the restriction 
is obsolete, inappropriate or impracticable, it may by order release the restric­
tion in whole or in part. A release under this subsection may not change an 
endowment fund to a fund that is not an endowment fund: 
(c) A release under this section may not allow a fund to be used for purposes 
other than educational, religious, charitable or other eleemosynary purposes 
of the institution affected. 
(d) This section does not limit the application of cy pres or approximation. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4Sa-S33 (1997). 
103. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 4Sa-S33(a) (1997). 
104. See id. § 4Sa-S33(b). 

lOS. See id. § 4Sa-S33(c). 

106. See id. § 4Sa-S33(d). 
107. Cf. id. § 4Sa-S33(d). See supra Part I.A.4 for a discussion of the common 
law doctrine of cy pres. 
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mon law.108 Under common law, once a gift was completed, a do­
nor had no power to consent to changes in gift restrictions.109 
Instead, donees had to obtain court permission through the use of 
cy pres. Section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA allows gift restrictions to 
be modified solely through the consent of the donor. CUMIFA 
gives legal force to donor consent, something that did not exist at 
common law. 
3. 	 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
State Laws' Notes to UMIFA 
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State 
Laws provided notes to UMIFA. The notes have two main parts, a 
"Prefatory Note," which is an overview of the entire Act, including 
some commentary about each of UMIFA's sections, and a "Com­
ment" provision, which corresponds to each of UMIFA's sec­
tions.n° The Prefatory Note to UMIFA contains an initial 
discussion of both the problem with investing that charitable insti­
tutions were facing and the Ford Foundation study.111 In addition, 
part of the Prefatory Note addresses section 7 of UMIFA.112 It 
states that while donors are allowed by law to place restrictions on 
gifts, UMIFA provides a mechanism to obtain the donor's acquies­
cence in the face of "outmoded or wasteful or unworkable" 
restrictions.113 
UMIFA's Comment to section 7 also is very brief.114 It states 
that while the donor retains no property interest in a completed 
108. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a) (1997), with the discussion of com­
mon law principles supra Part LA. 
109. See supra Part LA for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts. 
110. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer, 7A Part II V.L.A. 
475 (1999). 
111. See supra Part Le.1 for a discussion of the statute's purpose. 
112. See UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer Prefatory Note, 7 A 
Part II V.L.A. 479 (1999). 
113. Id. The text of the Prefatory Note's reference to Section 7 of VMIFA states: 
It is established law that the donor may place restrictions on his largess which 
the donee institution must honor. Too often, the restrictions on the use or 
investment become outmoded or wasteful or unworkable. There is a need for 
review of obsolete restrictions and a way of modifying or adjusting them. The 
Act authorizes the governing board to obtain the acquiescence of the donor to 
a release of restrictions and, in the absence of the donor, to petition the appro­
priate court for relief in appropriate [circumstances]. 
Id. 
114. See VNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Aer § 7 cmt., 7A Part II 
V.L.A. 503-04 (1999). 
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gift, his restrictions control.115 Because use of the common law doc­
trine of cy pres had not always been helpful in dealing with donor 
restrictions, UMIFA allows the institution to obtain a release from 
those restrictions.116 No federal tax problems were anticipated by 
having the donor consent to such a release, because the donor did 
not have the right to enforce the restriction; the donor could only 
acquiesce in lessening it.117 
4. Legislative History of CUMIFA 
Connecticut enacted its version of UMIFA in 1973. Like the 
committee notes to UMIFA, the legislative history of CUMIFA 
does not directly address a donor's right to sue in order to enforce 
gift restrictions. During the hearings on CUMIFA, all of the discus­
sion in the legislature centered on investment advantages for chari­
table institutions.118 The Connecticut legislature'S judiciary 
Committee heard endorsements of the law from Lewis Hyde, the 
Executive Director of the Connecticut Conference of Independent 
Colleges, John Tilson, counsel for both the Connecticut Hospital 
Association and the Connecticut Association of Independent 
Schools, and Alan N. Houghton, Headmaster of the Hotchkiss 
115. See id. 
116. See id. 
117. See id. The text of the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA provides the 
following: 
There should be an expeditious way to make necessary adjustments when the 
restrictions [on gifts] no longer serve the original purpose. Cy pres has not 
been a satisfactory answer and is reluctantly applied in some states .... 
This section permits a release of limitations that imperil efficient adminis­
tration of a fund or prevent sound investment management if the governing 
board can secure the approval of the donor or the appropriate court. 
Although the donor has no property interest in a fund after the gift, none­
theless if it is the donor's limitation that controls the governing board and he 
or she agrees that the restriction need not apply, the board should be free of 
the burden .... 
If the donor is unable to consent or cannot be identified, the appropriate 
court may upon application ... release a limitation which is obsolete, inappro­
priate, or impracticable... . 
No federal tax problems for the donor are anticipated by permitting re­
lease of a restriction. The donor has no right to enforce the restriction, no inter­
est in the fund and no power to change the eleemosynary beneficiary of the 
fund. He may only acquiesce in a lessening of a restriction already in effect. 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 367, 381, 399 (1959); 4 AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 399, at 3084, § 399.4, at 3119, § 367.3, at 2846 
(3d. ed. 1967» (emphasis added). 
118. See generally House Proceeding, supra note 12; UMIFA Hearing, supra note 
12. 
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School.119 
The only other record of discussion is from the House Proceed­
ings of May 9, 1973, where several representatives spoke in support 
of the bill.120 Representative Bingham said that the bill would al­
Iowa rational solution to the problem of making "effective use of 
endowment and other investment funds."121 Representative Neid­
itz endorsed the bill because he saw it as a way to help charitable 
institutions better manage their endowments.122 He said that 
UMIFA was drafted by experts123 and was 
carefully worded-the bill contains carefully worded safeguards 
intended to protect the public interest and the charitable endow­
ments. The bill generally leaves it to the donor to make his own 
provisions for the matters covered in the bill. The bill applies 
when the donor has not specified another way. The matter of 
putting charitable [institutions] in a position to get the best total 
return is particularly important.124 
Representative Demerell voiced fear that the bill was dangerous 
because schools did not have investing expertise and, consequently, 
might make mistakes which would cost them more in the long 
run.125 Representative Healey said that Representative Demerell's 
fears were misplaced because the investment standard of care im­
posed on schools would require them to take into account long 
term risks.126 In addition, he said "if the donor has seen fit to spell 
out restrictions, then those restrictions govern. This bill steps in 
only in the event that he has not spelled out the restrictions."127 
119. See UMIFA Hearing, supra note 12, at 337, 338, 349, 350. Mr. Hyde ex­
plained that colleges in Connecticut needed to be investing in such a way as to account 
for inflation. See id. at 337. He also briefly explained the provisions of CUMIFA. See 
id. Mr. Tilson said that other kinds of schools have the same problems with endow­
ments that colleges have. See id. at 338. Mr. Houghton submitted his endorsement in 
the form of a letter which was read into the record by Mr. Olson. See id. at 349. The 
letter stated that CUMIFA would go a long way toward freeing up monies from endow­
ment for investing in a way that was appropriate for the modern economy. See id. at 
350. 
120. The Connecticut Senate passed the bill on the consent calendar on May 16, 
1973, without commentary. See 16 S. Proc., Pt. 8, 1973 Sess., at 3865 (Conn.). The bill 
passed the House by a vote of 140 for, and 1 against, with 10 either absent or not voting. 
See House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5736. 
121. House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5723. 
122. See id. at 5724. 
123. See id. at 5725. 
124. Id. at 5725-26. 
125. See id. at 5727-29. 
126. See id. at 5731-32. 
127. Id. 
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Representative Dooley supported the bill because "those en­
trusted with endowment funds with the passage of this bill will no 
longer have to rely on case law to govern their actions."128 Repre­
sentative Bevacqua supported the bill because he believed that de­
ceased donors would have acquiesced in changing restrictions on 
their gifts to accommodate their original intent.129 He echoed the 
belief of Representative Webber that releasing restrictions would 
bring about more scholarships for students.130 
The issue of a donor's right to sue if a donee violates section 
45a-533(a) is not addressed directly by the express language of 
UMIFA or CUMIFA, the notes to UMIFA, or the legislative his­
tory of CUMIFA. That issue arose for the first time in 1991, in Carl 
J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of Bridgeportpl 





The plaintiff, Carl J. Herzog Foundation, Inc. ("Foundation"), 
agreed, on August 12, 1986, to participate in a matching grant pro­
gram with the University of Bridgeport ("University"), a private 
institutionP2 If the University raised funds, the Foundation would 
match the amount, up to $250,000.133 The money was to "'provide 
need-based merit scholarship aid to disadvantaged students for 
medical related education."'134 The University wrote a letter on 
September 9,1986, accepting the Foundation's offerP5 By June 28, 
128. Id. at 5732-33. 
129. See id. at 5733-35. 
130. See id. 
131. No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 
1995), rev'd, 677 A.2d 1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
132. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1379. Since 1992, the University of Bridgeport has 
been controlled by "an affiliate of the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Unification 
Church." See Rabinovitz, supra note 19, at B1. 
The University of Bridgeport was the defendant in a suit filed by a "life trustee" of 
the University challenging the decision by the University's voting trustees to grant the 
Reverend Moon's affiliate, the Professor's World Peace Academy, the right to nomi­
nate sixty percent of the members of the board of trustees in exchange for a $50.5 
million loan. See Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 690 (Conn. 1995). 
The life trustee sued on the grounds that the vote violated the charter of the University 
by turning it into a sectarian institution. See id. The Connecticut Supreme Court, rely­
ing on common law, ruled that the life trustee did not have standing to sue. See id. at 
696. 
133. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380. 
134. Id. at 1379 (quoting the Foundation's Complaint). 
135. See id. at 1379-80. 
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1988, the University had raised its share of the money and the 
Foundation made its final grant of money.136 The money went to 
scholarships for the University's nursing program.137 
On June 20, 1991, the University closed its nursing program, 
but did not inform the Foundation until November 21,1991.138 The 
University did not request the Foundation's written consent to re­
lease the money for other purposes, nor did it apply to the court for 
a release as required by sections 45a-533(a) or (d) of CUMIFA.139 
The Foundation filed suit alleging that the funds were no longer 
being used for their specified purpose and that, instead, the funds 
were commingled with the University's general funds in violation of 
sections 45a-527(1) and (2) of the General Statutes of Connecti­
cut.140 The Foundation requested a temporary and permanent in­
junction ordering the University to segregate the $250,000, account 
for its use, and to spend the monies only for the purposes to which 
the Foundation had agreed. If the purposes of the gift could not be 
fulfilled, the Foundation wanted the University to give the money 
back.141 
The Foundation relied upon section 45a-533(a) to claim a right 
to sue.142 The Foundation's reasoning was that, by allowing the 
written consent of the donor to alter gift restrictions, the statute 
created a right to sue.143 The University relied upon the Comments 
to section 7 of UMIFA144 to claim that donors have no right of en­
forcement because they have no property interest in completed 
136. See id. at 1380. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. 
139. See id. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General 
Statutes of Connecticut. 
140. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380. Sections 45a-527(1) and (2) define institution 
and institutional fund, respectively. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-527 (1997). Since this 
case was dismissed for lack of standing to sue, it is not clear from the cases where the 
University actually put the money it received from the Foundation. It also is not clear 
whether the University has other medical related programs where it could use the 
money. 
141. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380. See infra Part III.B.3.c for a discussion of this 
Note's suggestion that standing be limited, which would not allow the Foundation to 
take the money back. The suggestion that standing be limited addresses the tax con­
cerns that the supreme court raised. See infra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Con­
necticut Supreme Court's holding. 
142. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381-82. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the 
statute, and supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533(a) of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut. 
143. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1381. 
144. See id. at 1383. See supra note 117 for the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA. 
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charitable giftS.145 Instead, the University argued that only the At­
torney General has the right to sue to enforce gift restrictions.146 
B. The Reasoning of the Connecticut Courts 
1. Connecticut Superior Court 
The trial court granted a motion to dismiss the case for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.147 The court held that the Foundation 
did not have standing under CUMIFA because the statute does not 
give the donor the right to enforce gift restrictions.148 The court 
read the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA149 and stated that 
CUMIFA gave" 'no property interest'" to the donor.150 The court 
noted that sometimes donors have been granted standing if "'the 
gift is conditional or ineffective, or there is a clear reservation of 
right to terminate or revoke it."'151 Because the Foundation did not 
reserve its rights, the court relied on common law and said that only 
the Attorney General may bring suit.152 The court ended its analy­
sis by quoting from section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Con­
necticut, which explicitly states that the Attorney General 
represents the public interest in protecting charitable gifts.153 The 
Foundation appealed.154 
2. Connecticut Appellate Court 
The appellate court reversed the trial court.155 The appellate 
145. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1383-84. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of 
section 7 of UMIFA. 
146. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1384. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of en­
forcing charitable gifts. 
147. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94­
0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995), rev'd, 677 A.2d 
1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
148. See id. at *3. 
149. See supra note 117 for the text of the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA. 
150. Herzog, 1995 WL 128255, at *2 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSlITU· 
TIONAL FUNDS Acr § 7 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 724 (1985». 
151. Id. (quoting 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 148, at 175-76 (1976». 
152. See id. at *3. The court said that the reason the Attorney General is put in 
charge of lawsuits is that once a gift is given to a charity the use of funds are matters of 
public, not private concern. See id. (citing Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 
A.2d 688, 696 (Conn. 1995); 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 148, at 175-76 (1976». 
153. See id. Section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Connecticut identifies "gifts, 
legacies or devises" as charitable gifts. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (1997). 
154. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 682 A.2d 998 
(Conn. 1996) (granting certification of Herzog's appeal). 
155. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 
1385 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). The dissent, however, 
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court held that section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA, which allows the 
written consent of the donor to alter restrictions on gifts, gave the 
Foundation standing.156 The court ruled that the statute creates a 
donor's right beyond common law because "[i]t would be anoma­
lous for a statute to provide for written consent by a donor to 
change a restriction and then deny that donor access to the courts 
to complain of a change without such consent. "157 The court relied 
on statutory interpretation and common law to make its ruling.15S 
The appellate court began its analysis with a discussion of the 
issue of standing.159 The court noted that standing is granted to 
those who have a "real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or 
equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the contro­
versy."160 The court further noted that standing is conferred either 
by statute or by being "classically aggrieved."161 The appellate 
court held that the Foundation had standing to bring suit because 
standing could be fairly implied in the statute.162 The court stated 
that there was no need to have a specific provision in a statute.163 
The court found the implication for standing in CUMIFA be­
cause the statute requires a gift recipient to obtain the written con­
sent of the donor in order to release restrictions on a gift.l64 Since a 
donor's right to consent to release a gift restriction did not exist at 
common law, the court reasoned that this was a statutorily created 
right to grant or withhold consent.165 Further, the court agreed 
endorsed the reasoning of the appellate court. See id. at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissent­
ing). See infra Part n.B.3.b for a discussion of the dissent in the supreme court's 
decision. 
156. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1380-81. 
157. Id. at 1385. 
158. See id. at 1381-85. 
159. See id. at 1380-81. 
160. Id. at 1381. Standing is "a practical concept designed to ensure that courts 
and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that 
judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy." 
Id. (citing Unisys Corp. v. Department of Labor, 600 A.2d 1019, 1022 (Conn. 1991)). 
161. Id. (citing Steeneck v. University of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688, 692 (Conn. 
1995)). The court stated that since the Foundation was relying on the statute for stand­
ing, it would not analyze whether the Foundation was classically aggrieved. See id. at 
1381 n.2. Further, the court said that the issue of standing is different than a legal 
interest. A legal interest concerns the merits of the case. See id. at 1381. 
162. See id. at 1381, 1385. 
163. See id. at 1381 (citing Bucholz's Appeal from Probate, 519 A.2d 615, 620-21 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987)). The court said that standing could be implied because the 
question of standing is only whether the interest the person is trying to protect "is ar­
guably within the zone of interests" protected by the statute. Id. 
164. See id. at 1385. 
165. See id. at 1381-82. 
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with the Foundation's argument that, if the donor could not enforce 
subsection 45a-533(a), the statute itself would be rendered 
meaningless.166 
The appellate court next examined the legislative intent of 
CUMIFA.167 The court noted the Connecticut legislature intended 
to create a means for colleges to "seek a release" of gift restrictions 
from donors directly and that CUMIFA would allow more freedom 
to use their endowments.168 However, the court noted "that the 
right championed by the plaintiff, namely, a statutory interest in a 
completed gift that is sufficient to require [the donor's] consent, ... 
is not inconsistent with the statutory right of a donee to obtain a 
release of a" gift restriction.169 
The court then turned to the official comments in UMIFA.170 
The court noted the comments show that the drafters' purpose was 
to have sections 45a-526 to 45a-534 read together, so as to make 
uniform law.171 The court went on to state that the main purpose of 
UMIFA is to provide a mechanism whereby, with donor consent, a 
charitable institution can modify obsolete restrictions. l72 The court 
stated that written consent is required because donors have the 
right to place restrictions on gifts.173 
The court then addressed the two arguments raised by the Uni­
versity, both of which relied on the Comment to section 7 of 
UMIFA. First, the University posited that the Comment states that 
donors have no enforcement right in a completed giftY4 The court 
dismissed this argument by noting that the Comment was made ex­
plicitly in response to tax implications of a donor releasing a gift 
restriction and did not apply to enforcing the restrictions them­
selves.175 Second, the University claimed that only the Attorney 
General can enforce restrictions on a completed gift because do­
166. See id. at 1382. 
167. See id. 
168. Id. To support its statement, the court offered quotations from Connecticut 
state legislators. See id. at 1382 n.4 ("This bill ... aid[s] charitable corporations ... in 
the better management of their endowments ...."). 
169. Id. at 1382. 
170. See id. 
171. See id. at 1383 (citing Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Conn. 
1993)). 
172. See id. (citing UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory 
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)). 
173. See id. 
174. See id. at 1382. See supra note 117 for the text of the Comment to section 7 
of UMIFA. 
175. See Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1383. 
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nors have no property interest in the gift.176 The court conceded 
that the Comment states specifically that no property interest is cre­
ated in a gifU77 However, the court pointed out that "it does not 
follow that no protect able statutory interest exists for the purpose 
of standing."178 Instead, the court said that the statute created a 
protect able interest in the donor which can be enforced by individu­
als other than the Attorney GeneralP9 
The court built upon the University's argument that common 
law applied to this case. It pointed out that even under the com­
mon law of trusts, "[o]thers [besides the Attorney General] may ... 
have standing to enforce charitable trusts, such as trustees, donors 
of gifts and heirs and executors of wills, which standing includes the 
right to bring actions or to intervene in actions brought to enforce 
provisions of trusts or WillS."180 The appellate court justified its 
finding that CUMIFA contained an implied right to standing by cit­
ing Buchholz's Appeal from Probate.181 Buchholz held that 
although a statute does not specify that certain persons are covered, 
standing may be granted if it can be fairly implied.182 
With its emphasis on a statutorily created protectable interest, 
the court concluded by holding that "there has likely been an inva­
sion of a statutorily protected interest, that there is a causal connec­
tion between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's alleged 
176. See id. at 1384. 
177. See id. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. The court is not entirely clear, however, about what that interest is. 
180. Id. (citing Hartford v. Larrabee Fund Ass'n, 288 A.2d 71 (Conn. 1971)). The 
court also noted that in enforcing charitable trusts, the Attorney General is a necessary 
party in the suit. See id. (citing Copp v. Barnum, 276 A.2d 893, 894 (Conn. 1970)). 
181. See id. at 1385 (citing Bucholz's Appeal from Probate, 519 A.2d 615, 621 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1987)). 
182. See Bucholz, 519 A.2d at 621. In Buchholz, the father of an adult woman 
who was mentally disabled sued for the right to be named the guardian of her estate. 
See id. at 616. When the probate court made him a standby guardian and his ex-wife 
guardian, he appealed. See id. His case was dismissed by the trial court, which claimed 
that he lacked standing under section 45-288 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, 
holding that he was not "aggrieved." [d. at 617. The appellate court overturned the 
decision and held that although the term "parents" was not contained in the statute, it 
was fair to imply that parents had an interest under the statute because of the special 
relationship the law grants parent and child. See id. at 619. Further, the court dismissed 
an argument that relied on the fact that a 1982 version of section 45-322 of the General 
Statutes of Connecticut deleted the requirement of consent by parents before an appli­
cation of guardianship could be granted, as not dispositive of whether parents had an 
interest under the statute. See id. at 620. The court stated that the deletion was only 
because parents of adults who were mentally disabled were often difficult to locate and 
not because parents did not have an interest in their child's well being. See id. 
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injury, and that a court can redress the injury."183 The appellate 
court reversed the trial court by granting standing to the Founda­
tion, and ordered the case be tried.184 The University appealed and 
the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed to hear the petition.185 
3. Connecticut Supreme Court 
a. Majority 
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, reversed 
the appellate court and ruled that CUMIFA did not establish stand­
ing for donors under section 45a-533(a).186 Instead, the supreme 
court agreed with the trial court that common law applied and only 
the Attorney General has standing to sue to enforce the terms of 
completed giftS.187 The majority used statutory interpretation and 
common law principles to determine that the Connecticut legisla­
ture did not intend CUMIFA to provide standing to a donor who 
made a completed charitable gift to an institution.188 
After a presentation of the facts and procedural history, the 
majority discussed the common law.189 The majority stated that at 
common law, if one made a completed charitable gift, only the At­
torney General could sue to enforce its terms unless the donor re­
served the right to enforce its terms in the gift instrument.19o The 
reason for this is that, by virtue of their position, Attorneys General 
are considered "closely associated with the public nature of chari­
ties."19I The court noted that others, such as trustees or fiduciaries, 
may enforce a charitable trust if they have a special interest but not 
"the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin."192 
In such cases, the Attorney General still must be joined to protect 
183. Herzog, 677 A.2d at 1385. 
184. See id. 
185. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 682 A.2d 998 
(Conn. 1996). The appeal was limited to whether CUMIFA created statutory standing 
for donors to sue to enforce provisions of a charitable gift. See id. at 998. 
186. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
1002 (Conn. 1997). 
187. See id. 
188. See id. at 997-1002. 
189. See id. at 997-99. 
190. See id. at 997 & n.2 (citing Attorney Gen. v. First United Baptist Church, 601 
A.2d 96, 98 (Me. 1992); Sarkeys v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 40, 592 P.2d 529, 533 
(Okla. 1979); Wilbur v. University of Vermont, 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 348 cmt. f (1959». See supra Part 1.A.2 for a discussion of 
enforcement of charitable trusts. 
191. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 998 n.3. 
192. Id. at 998 n.4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959». 
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the public interest.193 The court concluded that, under common 
law, the Foundation had no standing.194 
Having explained the common law, the court then discussed 
the Foundation's contention that the common law had been altered 
by the fact that section 45a-533(a) requires the written consent of a 
donor in order to alter a gift restriction and thus, standing could be 
implied.195 The court explained that a well-recognized principle of 
statutory construction is that courts should not read into the statute 
anything that alters the common law; instead, the common law can 
be altered only by the "plain meaning" of the statute.196 The court 
193. See id. The court then applied these principles to Herzog because Connecti­
cut codified the rule that the Attorney General is the officer in charge of enforcing 
charitable gifts in section 3-125 of the General Statutes of Connecticut. See id. at 998 
n.3. Section 3-125 codifies the "common law rule and has entrusted the attorney gen­
eral with the responsibility and duty to 'represent the public interest in the protection of 
any gifts, legacies or devises intended for public or charitable purposes ....'" Id. (quot­
ing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-125 (1997». 
194. See id. at 999. 
195. See id. at 999 & n.6. 
196. Id. at 997 (citing State v. Luzietti, 646 A.2d 85, 88 (Conn. 1994); State v. 
Sanchez, 528 A.2d 373, 376 (Conn. 1987); Ahem v. City of New Haven, 459 A.2d 118, 
121 (Conn. 1983». In each of the cited cases, the court held that courts cannot alter the 
common law further than the words in a statute allow. 
In Luzietti, a defendant was charged with the crime of operating a motor vehicle 
while his license was under suspension. See Luzietti, 646 A.2d at 86. The issue before 
the court was whether a statute allowing a trial court to reduce a defendant's sentence 
also conferred authority on the court to re-hear a motion for acquittal after the court 
had denied such a motion and upheld the defendant's conviction. See id. at 86-88. The 
trial court initially denied the defendant's motion for acquittal and the defendant began 
serving his sentence. The court granted a motion to re-argue the motion for acquittal 
and subsequently granted the acquittal motion based on recently discovered informa­
tion that insufficient evidence was presented to the jury to support its verdict of operat­
ing a vehicle while his license was suspended. The state argued that the judge did not 
have the jurisdiction to vacate the conviction because the defendant had already begun 
serving his sentence. See id. at 86-87. The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that there 
was no legislative grant of power to reconsider the motion. It then applied the common 
law rule that denies a court jurisdiction to modify its judgment, and held that the trial 
court could not reconsider the motion. See id. at 88. The court ruled that the statute 
would have allowed the court to reduce the sentence of the defendant. See id. 
In the Sanchez case, the defendant was charged with perjury while providing an 
alibi for her boyfriend during the boyfriend's trial for burglary, assault, and larceny. See 
Sanchez, 528 A.2d at 374. Sanchez had testified that she and her boyfriend took 
Sanchez's daughter out of school and all three were in Massachusetts at the time of the 
crime. See id. The attendance records for the daughter indicated that she was in school 
on the day in question. See id. at 374-75. The issue before the court was how much 
corroboration the state needed to prove perjury under a Connecticut perjury statute 
which was silent on the issue. See id. at 375-79; see also id. at 373 n.1 (citing section 53a­
156(a) of the General Statutes of Connecticut, which defines perjury). The court ruled 
that since the statute was silent, and the legislative history did not contain any evidence 
that the statute was "anything but a direct codification of the common law crime of 
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pointed out that even the Foundation conceded that there is noth­
ing in the plain language of the statute expressly giving donors the 
right to sue.197 
The court further supported its rejection of the appellate 
court's reading of subsection (a) by an analysis of the intent of the 
Connecticut legislature.198 In order to do so, like the trial and ap­
pellate courts, the supreme court used the notes to UMIFA and the 
legislative history of CUMIFA to fill. in gaps in the text of 
CUMIFA.199 From UMIFA, the court relied on the Prefatory Note 
and the Comment to section 7.200 First, the court noted that the 
Prefatory Note to UMIFA states that UMIFA was created to allow 
colleges and universities to use their endowments more efficiently 
by providing "[a]n expeditious means to modify obsolete restric­
tions."201 The court said that UMIFA's Prefatory Note also states 
that colleges and universities had been facing uncertainty in the law 
of investment because "there [was] virtually no statutory law ... 
and [the] case law [was] sparse."202 From this, the court concluded 
that colleges and universities were the intended beneficiaries of the 
law.203 Second, the court noted that the Prefatory Note to UMIFA 
states that the Ford Foundation commissioned a study "to examine 
perjury," the court should apply the common law rule. Id. at 376. The common law 
rule was that the state had to have one live witness and corroboration from another 
source. In this case, the only evidence was the school attendance record and that was 
not enough. See id. 
Ahern involved a group of New Haven police officers who were convicted of illegal 
wiretapping. See Ahern, 459 A.2d at 118. The officers sued New Haven to recover the 
costs of defending themselves. See id. The officers argued that a 1975 amendment to a 
statute, indemnifying government officials, applied to their case even though the illegal 
actions took place before the amendment was passed. See id. at 121. Ahem argued 
that the lawsuit was brought after the statute was amended, and thus, applied to him. 
The court said that the applicable time period was when the violation occurred and 
refused to retroactively apply the statute. See id. The court said that the common law 
insulating government officials from tort liability applied in this case. See id. 
This Note argues infra Part III that the use of these criminal cases was not appro­
priate in Herzog because criminal statutes involve constitutional due process considera­
tions and civil statutes do not. 
197. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000. 
198. See id. at 1000-02. 
199. See id. See supra Parts II.B.I-2 for a discussion of the use of legislative his­
tory by the trial and appellate courts. 
200. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000-01. See supra Part I.C.3 for a discussion of the 
notes to UMIFA. 
201. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL 
FUNDS Acr Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)). 
202. Id. (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory 
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985)). 
203. See id. 
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the legal restrictions" on colleges which made them invest their en­
dowments conservatively.204 The court concluded that, since the 
drafters of UMIFA relied on the Ford Foundation study, the draft­
ers "attempted to offer as much relief as possible to charitable insti­
tutions, without any mention of concern regarding a donor's ability 
to bring legal action to enforce the condition on a gift."205 Third, 
the court endorsed the University's claim that the Comment to sec­
tion 7 of UMIFA said that the donor would not have a right to 
enforce a gift restriction, but "may only acquiesce in a lessening of a 
restriction already in effect."206 Fourth, although the above Com­
ment about the right to enforce a restriction arose in the context of 
a debate about an income tax deduction, the supreme court re­
jected the appellate court's limit on the meaning of that Comment 
to tax purposes.207 Instead, the court held that the sentence in the 
Comment means exactly what it says: only the Attorney General 
can bring suit and, therefore, the donor does not have standing to 
do SO.208 Fifth, the court stated that there is no evidence that the 
drafters of either UMIFA or CUMIFA intended that the donor 
would supplant the Attorney General as the enforcer of the terms 
of a gift.209 
After its analysis of the notes and comments to UMIFA, the 
court then turned to the legislative history of CUMIFA.210 The 
court made two arguments to support its conclusion that the Con­
necticut legislature did not intend to establish donor standing when 
it enacted CUMIFA.211 First, the court said that the legislature 
"knows how to establish statutory standing and it has done so 
unambiguously in a plethora of instances."212 Second, the court be­
lieved that the legislative history itself showed that donor standing 
204. Id. (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr Prefatory 
Note, 7A U.L.A. 706 (1985». 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1001 (quoting UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr § 7 
cmt., 7A U.L.A. 724 (1985». 
207. See id. The debate centered around the fact that under section 170(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, a donor who has not "permanently surrendered 'dominion and 
control'" over his charitable donation cannot take a tax deduction. Id. See supra Part 
1.A.3 for a discussion of section 170(a). It is important to note that the court's analysis 
did not address the fact that Herzog was a tax exempt foundation and did not face loss 
of a tax deduction. 
208. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001. 
209. See id. 
210. See id. at 1002. 
211. See id. 
212. Id. The court cited two instances: "General Statutes § 42-110g(a) (private 
cause of action based on violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); General 
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was discussed and rejected.213 To support its position, the court 
quoted Representative James T. Healey, who said" 'if the donor 
has seen fit to spell out restrictions, then those restrictions govern. 
This bill steps in only in the event that [the donor] has not spelled 
out the restrictions.'''214 The court also quoted Representative 
DaVid Neiditz, who stated" 'the bill generally leaves it to the donor 
to make his own proVisionsJor the matters covered in the bill. The 
bill applies when the donor has not specified another way."'215 In 
its analysis of the legislative history of UMIFA and CUMIFA,2I6 
the court concluded that if CUMIFA was read to establish standing 
for donors, it would defeat CUMIFA's purpose of making it easier 
for colleges and universities to free themselves of gift restrictions 
"by Virtue of the potential of lengthy and complicated litigation."217 
The supreme court reversed the appellate court and remanded the 
case to the appellate court, instructing it to affirm the trial court's 
decision not to grant standing to the Foundation.218 
b. Dissent 
The two judges who joined in dissent in Herzog endorsed the 
reasoning of the appellate court219 because they believed that this 
decision would have a chilling effect on donations to Connecticut 
schools.220 They said that the decision of the supreme court was 
akin to the donee "double-crossing the donor ... with impunity."221 
The two endorsed the "thoughtful and well reasoned opinion of the 
Statutes § 46a-99 (persons aggrieved by violations of antidiscrimination statute 'may 
petition the Superior Court for appropriate reJief)." Id. 
213. See id. 
214. Id. (quoting House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5732). 
215. Id. (quoting House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5726). 
216. See supra Part LCA for a discussion of the legislative history of CUMIFA. 
217. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (discussing the court's conclusion about legislative 
intent based on its reading of the legislative histories of both UMIFA and CUMIFA). 
218. See id. 
219. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the appellate court decision. The 
dissenting opinion was very brief and simply referred the reader to the appellate deci­
sion. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
220. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
221. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). The dissent stated the following: 
This decision is simply an approval of a donee, in the words of the donor, 
"double-crossing the donor," and doing it with impunity unless an elected at­
torney general does something about it. This decision will not encourage do­
nations to Connecticut colleges and universities. I fail to see why Connecticut, 
the home of so many respected schools that would honor their promises, 
should endorse such sharp practices and create a climate in this state that will 
have a chilling effect on gifts to its educational institutions. 
Id. 
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Appellate Court."222 
III. UMIFA & CUMIFA CREATE A LIMITED RIGHT TO SUE 

FOR THE DONOR 

In Carll. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. University of 
Bridgeport,223 the Connecticut Supreme Court decided that the 
Foundation did not have standing by applying a rule of statutory 
construction whereby a court should not go beyond the common 
law in interpreting statutes unless the language of the statute explic­
itly alters the common law.224 Further, the court looked to the offi­
cial comments to UMIFA and the legislative history to CUMIFA to 
discern legislative intent to grant donors standing under 
CUMIFA.225 The court held that there was no evidence of legisla­
tive intent to supplant the common law rule that only the Attorney 
General may sue to enforce the terms of a completed gift.226 The 
Connecticut Appellate Court held that one may imply standing 
based on the "written consent" requirement of section 45a­
533(a).227 The dissent in Herzog endorsed the appellate court's ap­
proach and expressed concern that the Connecticut Supreme 
Court's holding in Herzog might cause donors to hesitate to donate 
money to charitable institutions if they believe that their wishes will 
be flouted "with impunity."228 
There is another approach to the problem of donor standing 
under CUMIFA, however. One can view the legal interest created 
by CUMIFA as a donor's right to a process which don.'ees must ob­
serve in order to change restrictions on completed gifts. Recasting 
the legal right CUMIFA created for donors as the right to a process 
allows donor standing in a limited way that addresses and resolves 
both the weaknesses of the majority decision in Herzog and the 
concerns raised by all sides of the controversy.229 
222. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.B.2 for the appellate 
court's opinion. 
223. 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
224. See id. at 997. 
225. See id. at 1000-02. 
226. See id. at 1002. 
227. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the analysis applied by the appellate 
court. 
228. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002 (McDonald, J., dissenting). See supra Part II.B.3 
for a further discussion of the dissent. 
229. See infra Part I1I.B for a discussion of limiting donor standing to the right to 
enforce the process of releasing gift restrictions outlined in CUMIFA. 
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A. 	 The Weaknesses of the Connecticut Supreme Court's Decision 
in Herzog 
The Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Herzog contains 
several weaknesses.23o First, the court's analysis disregarded the 
plain language of the statute, which clearly alters the common law. 
In doing so, the court contravened one of its own well-established 
rules of statutory construction. Second, in determining its statutory 
construction, the court relied upon cases that are questionable as 
precedent for the Herzog case. Third, the court's discussion of leg­
islative intent was based upon inconclusive legislative history. 
Fourth, the court's decision allowed the University to violate 
CUMIFA with impunity. 
1. 	 The Court's Decision Disregarded the Plain Language 
of CUMIFA, Which Clearly Alters the 
Common Law 
The first weakness in the Herzog case is that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court ignored the plain language of the statute, which 
clearly alters the common law. In doing so, the court disregarded 
its own well-established rule for statutory construction. The Con­
necticut Supreme Court said that there was nothing in the legisla­
tive history to CUMIFA that suggested that the legislature wanted 
to "supplant" the common law rule that the Attorney General is 
the enforcer of the terms of charitable gifts.231 However, this state­
ment ignores the fact that, under common law, donors had no 
power to consent to any change in a completed gift.232 Under com­
mon law, the written consent of the donor was not required to alter 
restrictions on completed gifts. The donor had control over a com­
pleted gift only if he took the initiative to reserve such power in the 
gift instrument.233 CUMIFA, on the other hand, allows the written 
consent of the donor to alter the terms of a gift restriction and does 
not mention reserving such power in the gift instrument.234 The 
230. This Note argues that the primary reason for the flaws in the Herzog deci­
sion stems from the fact that the court incorrectly labeled the right the statute created 
in the donor as a property interest in the gift. See infra Part III.B for a discussion of 
this point. 
231. 	 See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002. 
232. Such consent, presented to a court in an action for cy pres, would have been 
meaningless. See supra Part 1.A.4 for discussion of donor rights under the common law 
and the doctrine of cy pres. 
233. 	 See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts. 
234. This argument is different from what the Connecticut Supreme Court said. 
The court stated that one should apply the common law rule that only donors who 
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court's opinion ignores the fact that section 45a-533(a) alters the 
common law in that it allows donors to consent to changes in a 
completed gift and gives legal force to that consent by permitting 
charitable institutions to avoid the costs of having to go to court to 
change the terms of the gift.235 
The court's opinion also is problematic because it does not ad­
dress section 45a-533(b), which does state, explicitly, when the 
drafters expected the Attorney General to be heard.236 If the do­
nor's written consent "cannot be obtained by reason of his death, 
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification," the do­
nee may ask a court to release the restriction and the Attorney 
General must have an opportunity to be heard.237 The Connecticut 
Supreme Court did not discuss how its decision to deny donors a 
statutory implied private right of action under section 45a-533(a) 
impacts on the proper reading of section 45a-533(b). 
In disregarding both the plain language of the statute and the 
impact of section 45a-533(a) on section 45a-533(b), the court failed 
to follow its own principle of statutory construction: all parts of the 
statute should be given meaning.238 This principle of statutory con­
struction, noticeably absent in the Herzog decision, is a presump­
tion that every "sentence, clause, or phrase in a legislative 
enactment" has a purpose.239 The Connecticut Supreme Court has 
said that "[s]tatutes should be construed so that no part of a legisla­
tive enactment is to be treated as insignificant and unnecessary."240 
In addition, this rule of statutory construction comports with what 
the United States Supreme Court said in Bennett v. Spear:241 it is a 
court's "duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word' 
reserved control in the gift instrument could modify and revoke gifts. See supra Part 
II.B.3 for a discussion of the Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning. 
The argument that section 45a-533 of CUMIFA goes beyond the common law is 
reinforced by the discussion, infra this subsection, of another rule of statutory construc­
tion that Connecticut courts follow: the presumption that all parts of a statute have 
meaning. 
235. See supra Parts LA, I.C, II.B.3. For a discussion of the fact that the Connect­
icut Supreme Court stated that one purpose of CUMIFA was to allow donees to avoid 
litigation costs, see supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
236. See supra note 102 for a complete text of section 45a-533 of the General 
Statutes of Connecticut. 
237. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997). See supra note 102 for the complete 
text of section 45a-533. 
238. See, e.g., State ex reI Kennedy v. Frauwirth, 355 A.2d 39, 41 (Conn. 1974) 
(citing Charlton Press, Inc. v. Sullivan, 214 A.2d 354, 357 (Conn. 1965». 
239. Id. (quoting Charlton Press, 214 A.2d at 357). 
240. Id. 
241. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
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... rather than to emasculate an entire section" of a statute.242 It is 
not clear why the Connecticut Supreme Court did not apply this 
rule in its decision.243 
Under the Connecticut Supreme Court's analysis, section 45a­
533(b) is rendered "insignificant and unnecessary," contrary to the 
courts principle of presuming purpose in every sentence of a stat­
ute.244 That is, in assuming that the Attorney General always is the 
only one who can sue to enforce gift restrictions, the court does not 
explain why the statute specifically lists conditions under which the 
Attorney General must be heard.245 The decision of the Connecti­
cut Supreme Court seems to "emasculate" section 45a-533(b) be­
cause when the court created a role for the Attorney General in 
section 45a-533(a) where none existed, it made section 45a-533(b) 
unnecessary. None of the Connecticut courts discussed section 45a­
533(b) and the impact that finding or denying standing would have 
on it. 
2. 	 The Court's Solution to Donor Standing Under 

CUMIFA is Based on Questionable Precedent 

The Connecticut Supreme Court based its decision on ques­
tionable precedent. The court relied on cases containing a rule for 
analyzing statutes which replace or codify common law:246 State v. 
Luzietti,247 State v. Sanchez,248 and Ahern v. City of New Haven.249 
The rule that the Connecticut Supreme Court used in these cases is 
242. Id. at 173 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538 (1955) 
(quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,30 (1937))) (alteration in 
original). 
243. The Connecticut Appellate Court applied the rule implicitly in its decision 
when it said "[i]t would be anomalous for a statute to provide for [the] written consent 
[of the] donor ... and then deny that donor access to the courts ...." Carl J. Herzog 
Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1385 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), 
rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
244. Frauwirth, 355 A.2d at 4l. 
245. If the donor's written consent "cannot be obtained by reason of his death, 
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification," the donee can ask a court to 
release the restriction and the Attorney General must have an opportunity to be heard. 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997). See supra note 102 for the complete text of 
section 45a-533. 
246. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
997 (Conn. 1997); supra Part II.B.3. 
247. 646 A.2d 85 (Conn. 1994). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts of 
Luzietti. 
248. 528 A.2d 373 (Conn. 1987). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts 
of Sanchez. 
249. 459 A.2d 118 (Conn. 1983). See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts 
of Ahern. 
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that courts may not go beyond the common law if the language of 
the statute does not explicitly allow it.250 The supreme court did 
not explain why it applied this rule instead of the analysis for a 
statutory implied private right of action.251 It is important to note 
that none of the three cases involved a standing issue. Instead, each 
case dealt with people charged with crimes.252 Further, none of the 
cases covered issues for which an alternative test was available. 
However, with Herzog, the test for standing was an available alter­
native, and it is a test the Connecticut courts use at other times.253 
A rule prohibiting the alteration of the common law in criminal 
matters is an important one, given that criminals are entitled to con­
stitutionally protected due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.254 Altering the common law af­
ter arrest would at least raise the issue of notice.255 But the rele­
vance of these cases remains a critical question because the court 
did not adequately explain why it used a rule of statutory construc­
tion developed for criminal cases instead of traditional implied pri­
vate right of action analysis when it decided Herzog. 
Furthermore, the rule stating that courts may not go beyond 
the common law in statutory interpretation, particularly as it is ar­
ticulated in Sanchez, would not apply to section 45a-533(a) of 
CUMIFA even if one could argue that it might apply to other kinds 
of statutes. In Sanchez, the court stated that it did not go beyond 
the common law because there was no indication that the statute 
was "anything but a direct codification of the common law crime of 
perjury."256 However, in the text of section 45a-533(a:) ofCVMIFA 
the legislature has gone beyond the common law.257 
The other cases that the Connecticut Supreme Court relied 
upon in the Herzog decision were of two types, both of which also 
250. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 999. 
251. This Note argues, infra Part III.B, that one explanation for this confusion 
over which analysis to use stems from the fact that the courts cast the legal interest 
incorrectly as an interest in the gift itself. 
252. See supra note 196 for a discussion of the facts of these cases. 
253. See supra Part I.B for examples of cases where the Connecticut courts used 
analysis for statutory implied private right of action. 
254. See LaChance v. Erickson, 118 S. Ct. 753, 756 (1998) ("The core of due pro­
cess is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard." (citing Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,542 (1985))); United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 
259, 265-67 (1997) (stating that, in criminal cases, due process includes notice). 
255. See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 265-67; see also LaChance, 118 S. Ct. at 756. 
256. State v. Sanchez, 528 A.2d 373, 376 (Conn. 1987). 
257. See supra Parts LA and I.C for a discussion of how CUMIFA altered the 
common law. 
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are questionable precedent. First, there were cases that dealt with 
standing to enforce charitable trustS.258 In those cases, standing was 
interpreted according to the common law, allowing only the Attor­
ney General and persons with a special interest to sue to enforce 
the terms of gifts.259 However, these cases are of doubtful value to 
Herzog because they did not involve a statute at all.260 The second 
set of cases upon which the Connecticut Supreme Court relied also 
are not on point because, while they dealt with interpreting and 
applying other sections of CUMIFA, they did not concern the issue 
of donor standing.261 
3. 	 The Court Based Its Analysis of Legislative Intent upon 
Inconclusive Legislative History 
The third aspect of the Herzog decision that is problematic is 
258. See supra note 190 and infra note 259 for a list of the cases upon which the 
majority relied. 
259. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
997-98 (Conn. 1997). The court cited the following cases from the common law: Lopez 
v. Medford Community Center, Inc., 424 N.E.2d 229 (Mass. 1981) (stating plaintiffs had 
to join Attorney General when members of charitable corporation brought action 
against board of directors for corporate mismanagement); Marin Hospital District v. 
Department ofHealth, 154 Cal. Rptr. 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (holding hospital did not 
buy the computerized body scanner for which it solicited donations, but donors may not 
recover their money); Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 417 N.Y.S.2d 715 (App. Div. 1979) 
(holding Attorney General had no standing to sue on behalf of recipients of charitable 
gift of stock who sued to be paid those dividends. Attorney General has no standing to 
sue on behalf of ultimate beneficiaries); Sarkeys v. Independent School District No. 40, 
592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979) (holding Attorney General had authority to settle suit where 
Attorney General was party when school sued descendants of charitable foundation for 
indirect self-dealing); Wier v. Howard Hughes Medical Institute, 407 A.2d 1051 (Del. 
Ch. 1979) (holding only Attorney General has the right to enforce charitable trust, not 
the administrator of the charitable trust who tried to apply the intention of the donor); 
Hagaman v. Board of Education, 285 A.2d 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1971) (holding 
son of deceased donor denied return of property conveyed under condition that school 
be built, when school ultimately closed and used as park, because there were no words 
in the instrument making a grant of a fee simple determinable or condition subsequent); 
Wilbur v. University of Vermont, 270 A.2d 889 (Vt. 1970) (holding that charitable trust 
does not fail simply because trustees violate the terms of the trust; heirs may not compel 
reversion, but Attorney General can sue trustees to force observance of trust); McGee 
v. Vandeventer, 158 N.E. 127 (Ill. 1927) (holding abuse of trust does not cause reverter 
unless there is a reserved right in gift, but equity allows Attorney General to sue to 
compel observance of conditions). See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-99. 
260. See supra Parts LA and I.C for a discussion of how CUMIFA altered the 
common law. 
261. Herzog was the first case in which the issue of donor standing under 
CUMIFA arose. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1000 (citing Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 
A.2d 1304, 1306 (Conn. 1993». 
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the court's reliance on legislative intent.262 There is no indication in 
either the comments to UMIFA or the legislative history to 
CUMIFA of what the legislature intended regarding donor standing 
under section 45a-533(a}.263 When it discussed its reading of legis­
lative intent, therefore, the court, extrapolated from other parts of 
the comments and legislative history.264 
The most problematic issue concerning the court's reliance on 
the legislative history is that the history itself is scant. First, there is 
no recorded legislative history from the Connecticut Senate. As a 
result, at best, one can speak of a legislative intent only for the Con­
necticut House. In the House of Representatives, of the one hun­
dred forty-one members voting on the bill, only seven made 
statements about the bill itself, and all seemed to offer different 
reasons for supporting it.265 Given this record, it is reasonable to 
ask whether one can glean anything about legislative intent from 
the statements of five percent of the one half of the Connecticut 
state legislature.266 It is also reasonable to ask how many of the 
seven House members were actively thinking about donor standing 
when they rose to speak about CUMIFA. When a court bases a 
large part of its decision on a scant record, in which there is no 
discussion of the issue the court is deciding, it runs the risk of seem­
ing to manipulate the record in order to reach a desired outcome, 
which, in turn, may undermine public confidence in the judicial 
system. 
Because there is no direct legislative history, the court relied 
upon segments of the official comments to UMIFA that addressed a 
tax issue rather than standing.267 The court identified the tax issue 
262. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the supreme court's reliance on 
legislative intent. 
263. See supra Part LC.4 for a discussion of the intent of the Connecticut 
legislature. . 
264. See supra Part II.B.3 for a discussion of the Connecticut Supreme Court's 
analysis. There are many law review articles which address the problems of trying to 
base a decision on legislative intent. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statu­
tory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); 
Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory 
Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REv. 593 (1995). 
265. See House Proceeding, supra note 12. The Representatives who spoke have 
been quoted supra Parts LC.4 and ILB.3. They are: Bingham, Neiditz, Demerell, Web­
ber, Healey, Dooley, and Bevacqua. Representative Churchill spoke, but only to recuse 
himself for possible conflict of interest. See House Proceeding, supra note 12, at 5727. 
266. Since there is no legislative record from the Senate, one cannot know 
whether there was discussion at all. 
267. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
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as the potential for donors to lose their tax deduction if they were 
granted standing to sue and used the tax concern to bolster its deci­
sion to deny standing to donors.268 The court's use of the tax issue 
presents problems, however. In this particular case, taxes seem to 
be irrelevant because the Herzog Foundation is a tax exempt organ­
ization and, by definition, cannot take tax deductions.269 
4. 	 The Court's Decision Allowed the University to Disobey 
CUMIFA with Impunity270 
As the dissent in Herzog stated, the Connecticut Supreme 
Court's decision may send the wrong message to both donors and 
donees.271 The dissent stated that the signal the Herzog decision 
may send to potential donors is that their wishes can be disregarded 
"with impunity," resulting in a two-fold risk.272 The first risk is that 
donors will now be reluctant to make gifts to charitable institu­
tions.273 The second risk is that the decision, while purporting to 
help charities, will hurt those institutions in the long run.274 These 
1001-02 (Conn. 1997); supra Part II.B.3. The court also relied upon the Comment to 
section 7 of UMIFA for this part of its analysis. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001-02; supra 
Part II.B.3. 
268. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1001; supra Part II.B.3. 
269. See supra Part I.A.3 for a discussion of the tax issues implicated in Herzog. 
Section 500 of the Internal Revenue Code covers tax exempt organizations. See 1.R.e. 
§ 501-509 (West Supp. 1998). Section 501(c) lists the kinds of organizations that are tax 
exempt, such as foundations and corporations operated for religious, charitable, educa­
tional, or literary purposes. See 1.R.e. § 501(c) for a complete list of purposes and 
organizations. The section also states that organizations cannot devote monies to "in­
fluence legislation" or to "political campaign[s]." Id. § 501(c). Since foundations are 
tax exempt, if they donate money to other charitable organizations, they cannot take a 
tax deduction under section 170. See I.R.e. § 170, for the list of deductions. Of course, 
individual donors who do not have foundations set up can take a deduction for charity. 
See supra Part 1.A.3 for a discussion of charitable deductions for individuals. Private 
foundations are covered specifically by 1.R.e. §§ 507-509. 
See Charles E. Muller, II, Private Foundations-Self Dealing (Section 4941), Tax 
Mgmt. (BNA), at A-I (1996), and Sue Stem Stewart & Johanna V. Bartlett, Private 
Foundations-Distributions (Sec. 4942),880 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) (1996), for more infor­
mation about tax exempt foundations and their regulation in the Internal Revenue 
Code. There is a larger question, beyond the scope of this Note, about whether any 
statute should be interpreted based on tax implications which, of course, could be 
changed by the Congress at any time. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. l. 
270. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
1002 (Conn. 1997) (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
271. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
272. Id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
273. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
274. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting). 
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risks may cause either a decrease in gifts to charities,275 or an in­
crease in donors reserving an interest in the gift instrument. 
Indeed, at least one practitioner is advising estate planners to 
take into account the Herzog decision in considering how to create 
charitable gift instruments.276 He took special note that colleges 
and universities supported the majority decision with amici curiae 
briefs.277 His suggestion for avoiding the problems donors face in 
light of the decision was to use "'reverter' clauses. "278 If a right of 
reverter is inserted into the gift instrument, then the donor retains a 
specific right to control the gift and takes that right away from the 
Attorney General.279 
The decision in Herzog disregarded the plain language of 
CUMIFA, relied upon questionable precedent and inconclusive leg­
islative history, and allowed the University of Bridgeport to violate 
CUMIFA. A better result might have been reached had the court 
used its test for statutory implied private rights of action to decide 
the case.280 
B. 	 The Legal Interest CUMIFA Creates is the Right to a Process, 
the Violation of Which Gives Donors Standing 
The Connecticut courts were correct in holding that CUMIFA 
did not create a donor's right in a charitable gift itself. However, 
the right that CUMIFA did create is a right to a process which do­
nees must observe in order to change restrictions on completed 
gifts. 
1. 	 Connecticut Courts Analyzed Whether CUMIFA 
Created a Donor's Legal Interest in the Gift Itself 
In Herzog, each level of the Connecticut courts analyzed 
whether CUMIFA created a legal interest for the donor in the 
gift.281 Given the legal interest the courts analyzed, it is under­
275. See id. (McDonald, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision will 
"create a climate ... that will have a chilling effect on gifts to [the state's] educational 
institutions"). 
276. See Ronald R. Volkmer, Can Donor Enforce Charitable Gift?, 25 EST. PLAN. 
138, 139 (1998). 
277. 	 See id. 
278. Id. Reverter clauses create a reversionary interest in the donor. See supra 
note 6 for a discussion of reversionary interests. 
279. 	 See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 998-99. 
280. 	 See infra Part III.B. 
281. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 997-1002; Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University 
of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381-85 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Carl J. Herzog Found., 
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stand able why the supreme court was reluctant to grant such an 
interest to the donor. Such an interest indeed may have altered 
common law beyond what the Connecticut legislature may have in­
tended.282 But, in trying to preserve the main purpose of the stat­
ute, to make it easier for donees to alter the terms of charitable 
gifts, the court's analysis created its own problems.283 A better 
reading of the legal interest CUMIFA created is to follow the plain 
language of section 45a-533(a) through 45a-533(d), which outlines a 
process by which donees can alter terms of a charitable gift. 
2. 	 The Plain Language of CUMIFA Creates a Legally 
Protected Interest in a Process by Which Donees 
May Alter Gifts 
A reading of the plain language of CUMIFA's section 45a-533 
clearly shows a process by which a charitable institution may alter 
the terms of a gift. Under section 45a-533(a), the donee may simply 
obtain the written consent of the donor.284 If consent is obtained, 
the donee avoids the cost of litigation and the gift is altered.285 
Under section 45a-533(b), if the donor's "consent cannot be ob­
tained by reason of his death, disability, unavailability, or impossi­
bility of identification," the donee may ask the court to release the 
restriction and the Attorney General must have the opportunity to 
be heard.286 Section 45a-533(c) directs that a "release" under sec­
tion 45a-533 cannot be granted for anything other than charitable 
purposes.287 Section 45a-533(d) states that courts may still use cy 
pres .288 It is important to note that the Connecticut courts did not 
analyze what would happen under CUMIFA if a donor was avail-
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, No. CV-94-0137902-S, 1995 WL 128255, at *2-3 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 17, 1995). See supra Part II for a discussion of the legal analysis of 
Herzog by all three Connecticut courts. 
282. One can imply this because it is clear that the primary purpose of CUMIFA 
was to make it easier on donees who needed to alter the terms of charitable gifts. See 
supra Part I.e. But, the mechanism chosen to accomplish that purpose, allowing do­
nors to consent to changes, empowered donors to a degree they never had under the 
common law. 
283. See supra Part lILA for a discussion of the flaws in the reasoning of the 
supreme court, and supra Part I.C for a discussion of CUMIFA's purpose. 
284. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut. 
285. See Herzog, 699 A.2d at 1002. 
286. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(b) (1997). 
287. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(c) (1997). For the sake of argument, this 
Note assumes that subsection (c) refers to releases both by the donor (subsection (a» 
and by the court (subsection (b». 
288. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(d) (1997). 
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able but refused to consent to changes in the gift.289 Since subsec­
tion (b) is specific about when it applies and does not specifically 
list donor refusal to consent, it is reasonable to argue that subsec­
tion (d) would apply; the common law process of cy pres would 
therefore have to be used.290 
Given that CUMIFA specifically outlines the process by which 
a donee can alter the terms of a charitable gift, it is reasonable to 
assume two things. First, CUMIFA is now the process by which , 
donees may alter the terms of gifts. This is a reasonable interpreta­
tion of CUMIFA because the statute creates a new process, yet spe­
cifically incorporates the only common law method of gift 
alteration, cy pres. Second, CUMIFA grants the donor a role in 
that process. Since section 45a-533(a) makes the donor part of the 
process, it is reasonable to argue that the statute creates a legally 
protected interest in the process for the donor. Thus, when the 
University altered the terms of Herzog's gift, without following 
either subsection 45a-533 (a), (b), or (d) of CUMIFA, it injured 
Herzog's legal interest in the process. A statutory implied private 
right of action may be found once the injury is recast in this way, 
and a donor whose interest is violated has standing to sue. 
Further, labeling the legal interest as an interest in the process 
avoids the problems which concerned the Connecticut Supreme 
Court. For example, if the interest is an interest in the process, the 
donor does not have an interest in the gift itself, and no tax 
problems are created. Furthermore, because the gifts themselves 
remain in the charitable sector, there is no need for concern that 
donors will use the written consent section of CUMIFA to revoke 
their gifts.291 
289. Although the appellate court stated that the donor could refuse to give its 
consent, it did not analyze what would happen if such an event occurred. See Carll. 
Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (1997). 
290. See supra Part 1.A.4 for a discussion of cy pres. A Connecticut court has 
applied section 45a-533(d), cy pres, when donors were dead, and thus, could not con­
sent to changes in gift restrictions. See Hartford Hosp. v. Blumenthal, No. CV-95­
0555462-S, 1996 WL 240440, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. April 15, 1996). 
The linking of the subsections of section 45a-533 of CUMIFA is suggested in the 
Prefatory Note to UMIFA, which states that the statute allows a release of gift restric­
tions "by donor acquiescence or court action." UNIF. MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL 
FUNDS ACT Prefatory Note, 7A Part II U.L.A. 477 (1999) (emphasis added). See supra 
note 100 and accompanying text for the full text. 
291. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a) (1997). This solution would also avoid 
the problem of reconciling the Comment to section 7 of UMIFA which states that do­
nors have no property interest in the gift. See supra Part I.C.3. See infra Part IIl.B.3.d 
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3. 	 Once the Right is Labeled as the Right to Have Donees 
Observe the Process CUMIFA Outlines, Donors 
Have a Statutory Implied Private Right of 
Action and thus Have Standing 
a. 	 Standing and private right of action analysis in Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, Bennett v. Spear, and National 
Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank 
& Trust CO.292 
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,293 Bennett v. Spear294 and 
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & 
Trust Co. ,295 the United States Supreme Court provided analysis of 
standing and the statutory implied private right of action. In Ben­
nett v. Spear,296 the United States Supreme Court held that, when a 
statute does not explicitly confer standing on a particular individual, 
the plaintiff must first satisfy the "'case' or 'controversy' require­
ment of Article III, which is the 'irreducible constitutional mini­
mum."'297 Thus, the plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test by 
"demonstrat[ing] that he has suffered an 'injury in fact,' that the 
injury is 'fairly traceable' to the actions of the defendant, and that 
the injury will likely be redressed by a favorable decision."298 
In Lujan, the Supreme Court said that when there is a statute, 
any injury must be personally experienced to satisfy the Article III 
for a discussion of how recasting the right CUMIFA creates addresses the concerns of 
the Connecticut courts. 
292. State courts are not required to follow the United States Supreme Court's 
analysis for standing. However, this Note presents the Supreme Court analysis for two 
reasons. First, it is clear that Connecticut has followed standing analysis as articulated 
by the Supreme Court in the past. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of standing 
analysis in Connecticut. Second, even if Connecticut refused to follow the analysis 
contained in Supreme Court cases, the suggestion in this Note might be useful to courts 
in other jurisdictions that might want to consider the Supreme Court analysis as an 
alternative way to interpret donor standing under UMIFA. 
293. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
294. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
295. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998). 
296. 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In Bennett, the Court found that plaintiffs with com­
mercial interests in a proposed irrigation project which the government rejected under 
the 1973 Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), 16 U.S.c. § 1531 (1994), had standing to 
sue under 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). The Court found that the plaintiffs fell under the zone 
of interests protected by the ESA. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 166. 
297. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162. 
298. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61). See supra Part I.B and supra note 
79 for a discussion of the Lujan case and other Supreme Court cases addressing stand­
ing in general, as well as standing under Connecticut law. 
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injury requirement.2<;}9 An individual can be injured through a vio­
lation of the "procedural rights" which a statute outlines, as long as 
the injury is connected to the individual's "own concrete harm."3oo 
Once a plaintiff can demonstrate a personally experienced in­
jury, the zone of interests analysis is used to determine whether the 
injury falls within the interests that the statute is designed to pro­
tect.301 In Bennett, the Supreme Court discussed how the "zone of 
interests" analysis should be used in determining standing.302 The 
Court held that the zone of interests analysis is part of the standing 
test unless such a test is "expressly negated" by Congress.303 
299. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (requiring that "the party seeking review be him­
self among the injured"). The Court said that it required the injury to be personal 
because if courts allowed anyone to sue for an injury to the general public it would be 
violating congressional authority to vindicate interests of the general public. See id. at 
576-77. 
300. Id. at 572 n.7, 573 n.8. 
301. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of zone of interests and standing analysis. 
302. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163-65. This discussion was necessary because ear­
lier Supreme Court cases did not clearly establish that the zone of interests test was part 
of standing analysis. See Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79, at 145. 
303. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 163. In Bennett, the Court granted standing to the plain­
tiffs, ranchers and irrigation districts, who had economic interests they claimed were 
harmed by government protection of endangered fish. They were allowed to bring suit 
under two provisions of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). See id. at 176-77. 
Regarding the ESA, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit had dismissed the 
case for lack of standing, because both held that the zone of interests protected by the 
ESA was the preservation of wildlife and that competing commercial interests were not 
within the zone of interests. See id. at 160-61. The Supreme Court overturned the 
decisions by pointing out that when Congress created the citizen-suit provision of the 
ESA, it wrote the following words: "'any person may commence a civil suit.'" Id. at 164 
(quoting 16 U.S.c. § 1540(g) (1994». The Court interpreted these words literally and 
held that the words negated the zone of interests test of standing under the ESA. How­
ever, Justice Scalia noted, in his opinion for the majority, that he believed the words 
negated the zone of interests test because they really enlarged the zone of interests to 
include every citizen. See id. at 165-66. 
The Court then found standing to sue under section 1536(a)(2) of the ESA, which 
requires "each agency to 'use the best scientific and commercial data available'" in 
making its decisions. Id. at 176. The Court said that the reason standing could be 
found is that, in this instance, the zone of interests test should be applied, "not by 
reference to the overall purpose of the Act in question (here, species preservation), but 
by reference to the particular provision of law upon which the plaintiff relies." Id. at 
175-76. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs' contention that the requirement of sec­
tion 1536(a)(2) was designed to prevent an overly zealous agency from causing "need­
less economic dislocation." Id. at 176. The vehicle the Court used to allow the plaintiffs 
a cause of action under section 1536(a)(2) was the Administrative Procedure Act 
("APA"). The APA allows "a right to judicial review of all 'final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in court: [5 U.S.c.] § 704." Bennett, 520 U.S. 
at 175. The only exceptions to this rule are if a statute explicitly excludes judicial review 
or if the agency has discretion. The Court stated that neither of the exceptions applied 
under the ESA. See id. 
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Under the analysis in Bennett, if the statute does not explicitly 
state which plaintiffs have standing, then courts should use the 
"zone of interests" analysis; however, if the statute does state 
which plaintiffs have standing, the test should not be used.304 In 
applying the zone of interests test, the Court said that one does not 
look at "the overall purpose of the Act in question . . . but . . . 
[refers] to the particular provision of the law upon which the plain­
tiff relies" in his claim.305 
In National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank 
& Trust CO.,306 the Supreme Court further clarified the zone of in­
terests test to be used in determining whether a particular individ­
ual has standing to sue under a statute which does not explicitly 
confer standing. At issue was whether a court should look for a 
legislative purpose to benefit the "would-be plaintiff," when con­
ducting a zone of interests analysis.307 The Court held that no such 
inquiry is required.30B All that a court should do is "first discern the 
interests 'arguably ... to be protected' by the statutory provision at 
issue [and] then inquire whether the plaintiff's interests affected ... 
are among them. "309 
b. 	 The Connecticut Supreme Court did not use zone of interests 
analysis to determine standing 
When it analyzed the standing problem in Herzog, the Con­
necticut Supreme Court did not use zone of interests analysis. In­
stead, it said that the common law of charitable trusts governed 
donor standing unless CUMIFA changed the common law.310 Be­
cause there was nothing in the plain language of CUMIFA explic­
304. See Bennett, 520 u.s. at 164. The reason the courts should not use the zone 
of interests analysis if the statute explicitly states which plaintiffs have standing is be­
cause the court recognizes that Congress has negated the zone of interests test in those 
instances. See id. 
305. Id. at 175-76. The Court cited other cases which refer to this rule, including 
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) and Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See Bennett, 520 
u.s. 	at 176. 
306. 118 S. Ct. 927 (1998). In this case, the Supreme Court allowed banks stand­
ing to sue under the provisions of the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.c.A. § 1759 
(West Supp. 1998). The banks challenged an interpretation of a provision of this law. 
See National Credit Union, 118 S. Ct. at 930. 
307. National Credit Union, 118 S. Ct. at 935. 
308. See id. 
309. Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153) (first alteration in original). 
310. See Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 
997-1000 (Conn. 1997). 
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itly altering the common law of charitable trusts, the court searched 
for a legislative intent to alter the common law.311 The court found 
no legislative intent, but did find a statement from the Comment to 
section 7 of UMIFA stating that UMIFA did not create a property 
interest in the gift.312 Because the court had labeled the interest as 
a property interest in the gift itself, the court used the Comment to 
section 7 of UMIF A to deny standing.313 No standing or zone of 
interests analysis was attempted.314 
c. 	 Applying the United States Supreme Court's standing and zone 
of interests analyses gives the Foundation standing 
Had the Connecticut Supreme Court both analyzed the right 
CUMIFA confers on the donor as the right to a process rather than 
as an interest in the gift, and applied standing and zone of interests 
analysis, the outcome in Herzog would have been different. 
CUMIFA does not state directly whether donors have standing.315 
Therefore, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions 
in Lujan, Bennett, and National Credit Union, the courts should 
have applied the three part standing test and its implied private 
right of action (zone of interests) analysis to Herzog.316 The analy­
sis that follows applies the three part standing test and the zone of 
interests analysis to the Herzog case.317 The main focus of analysis 
is on the "injury" and zone of interests facets of standing because, 
based on the facts, the other two portions of the test, causation by 
defendant's actions and ability to receive relief, are clearly met if 
the Foundation is within the zone of interests. 
1. 	 Injury 
In order to have standing, a plaintiff must personally experi­
311. See id. at 1000-02. 
312. See id. at 1001. 
313. See id. 
314. The Connecticut Appellate Court did attempt zone of interests analysis, but 
they also labeled the injury as an interest in the gift itself. See Carl J. Herzog Found., 
Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1382 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 
A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
315. See supra note 102 for the complete text of section 45a-533 of the General 
Statutes of Connecticut. 
316. The standing doctrine is not without its critics. See generally Fletcher, supra 
note 81; Kelso & Kelso, supra note 79; Sunstein, supra note 81. 
317. The three parts of the Article III standing test are injury, causation, and 
redressability. When there is a statute, the zone of interests analysis is used to deter­
mine whether the injury is an interest meant to be protected by the statute. See supra 
Part LB. 
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ence an injury to a legal interest that is in the zone of interests pro­
tected by the statute.318 The Connecticut courts refer to this as a 
"colorable claim."319 In Herzog, section 45a-533(a) of CUMIFA320 
required the University to seek the Foundation's written consent to 
alterations of the terms the Foundation had placed on its gift.321 
The Foundation's injury was the violation of its right to have the 
University follow this process. The injury is direct and personal be­
cause the statute describes the nature of the donor's stake in the 
process.322 The personally experienced injury is the denial of the 
right to be asked to give its written consent to alter a restriction on 
its gift. 
In order to determine whether the written consent provision is 
within the zone of interests, one can apply the rules that the 
Supreme Court set out in Bennett and National Credit Union. That 
is, do not look at "the overall purpose of the Act in question ... but 
. . . [refer] to the particular provision of the law upon which the 
plaintiff relies"323 in his claim, and do not be concerned with a legis­
lative intent to protect the prospective plaintiff.324 Applying these 
rules to Herzog, it is clear that the statute's requirement of written 
consent of the donor to alter gift restrictions is enough to bring the 
donor into the zone of interests protected by the statute. Section 
45a-533(a) specifically makes the donor a part of the process of gift 
alteration. If the donee wants to change the terms of a gift, the 
donee must request the donor's written consent or follow section 
45a-533( d) and obtain court permission using cy pres .325 The final 
legs of the test for standing are easy to meet once one recognizes 
318. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of zone of interests analysis as used by 
Connecticut courts. 
319. See Gay & Lesbian Law Students Ass'n at the Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law v. 
Board of Trustees, Univ. of Conn., 673 A.2d 484, 490 (Conn. 1996). 
320. See supra note 102 for the text of section 45a-533 of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut. 
321. It is reasonable to assume that if the University chose not to obtain the writ­
ten consent of Herzog, section 45a-533(d) of CUMIFA would require the University to 
apply for a release under the doctrine of cy pres, as cy pres is the common law rule. 
322. See supra Part III.B.3.a for a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), which requires injuries to be per­
sonally experienced. 
323. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175-76 (1997). The Court cited other cases 
which refer to this rule, including Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 
(1992), and Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 
U.S. 150 (1970). See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 175-76. 
324. See National Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 118 S. Ct. 
927, 935 (1998) (citing Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388,399-400 (1987)). 
325. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-533(a), (d) (1997). 
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that CUMIFA gives donors the right to a process and any deviation 
from the process constitutes an injury under the statute.326 
11. Causation 
The second part of the standing test is whether the injury to the 
plaintiff is caused by the action of the defendant.327 The University 
clearly did not request the written consent of the Foundation or 
seek court permission when it allegedly put the scholarship money 
in with its general funds.328 Thus, the injury to the Foundation's 
right to the process was caused by the University. 
iii. Relief 
The third requirement for standing is that the court be able to 
grant relief.329 In Herzog, because the injury is a violation of the 
right to a process, the relief allowed should be limited to enforcing 
the process for gift alteration as outlined in section 45a-533 of 
CUMIFA. That is, standing should be given to donors only to allow 
them to force the donee either to request the written consent of the 
donor, or to apply to the court for cy pres, as outlined in section 
45a-533, subsections (a) and (d), respectively. To allow donors to 
force donees to observe the process makes sense, given that in most 
states, Attorneys General often do not have the resources to inves­
tigate breaches of charitable trusts.330 The donor is in the best posi­
tion to know if the donee has violated the statute, and can act as a 
private attorney general in bringing suit.331 
In Herzog, the Foundation asked the court for very specific re­
lief, some of which the court could have granted. 
The plaintiff requested a temporary and permanent injunction, 
ordering the defendant to "segregate from its general funds 
matching grants totaling $250,000," an accounting for the use of 
the fund from the date of receipt until present, and a reestablish­
ment of the fund in accordance with the purposes outlined in the 
326. As discussed infra, standing should be limited to the narrow purpose of en­
forcing the process outlined by CUMIFA. 
327. See supra Part I.B and supra note 79 for a discussion of the causation com­
ponent of standing. 
328. See supra Part II.A for the facts in Herzog. 
329. See supra Part I.B and supra note 79 for a discussion of the relief component 
of standing. 
330. See Blasko et ai., supra note 42, at 48. 
331. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1997) (stating that purpose of 
"any person" language in the statute was to have private attorney general 
enforcement). 
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gift instrument, and, in the event that those purposes could not 
be fulfilled, to revert the funds and direct them to the Bridgeport 
Area Foundation, which is prepared to administer the funds in 
accordance with the original agreement.332 
Because CUMIFA gives a donor only the right to enforce a 
process, the Connecticut courts could not have granted the last part 
of the Foundation's request, returning the gift. The donor does not 
control the gift itself. The gift remains in the charitable sector and 
the donor's only right is to force the donee to observe the process 
for releasing gift restrictions that CUMIFA outlines. However, the 
court could have granted the injunction and then forced the Univer­
sity to request the Foundation's consent to use the money for a dif­
ferent purpose. If the Foundation refused to give consent or the 
University refused to ask for written consent, the court could have 
forced the University to obtain a release through cy pres .333 
d. 	 Analyzing the donor's legal interest as the right to a process 
resolves the concerns over donor standing that the 
Connecticut courts raised 
Allowing donor standing to enforce the process CUMIFA re­
quires to obtain a release from a gift restriction offers a solution 
which addresses the concerns raised by all of the Connecticut 
courts. It protects donors because it reduces the risk that donees 
will violate the statute with impunity. Limited standing addresses 
the potential tax issue by preventing the donor from retaining prop­
erty rights in the gift.334 In this regard, this solution is consistent 
with the legislative history that addresses tax issues under 
332. Carl J. Herzog Found., Inc. v. University of Bridgeport, 677 A.2d 1378, 1380 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1996), rev'd, 699 A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997). 
333. Of course, if a court applied cy pres, it would be free to disregard the donor's 
wishes. Thus, although donors have standing to sue under CUMIFA, they have no 
control over the outcome of the case. However, the point of the process is to have 
some recognition that donors have an interest in a fair process and an interest in know­
ing the fate of the gift. This approach is in keeping with the Supreme Court's decision 
in Northeastern Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America v. 
City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). The City of Jacksonville had a law which 
required a yearly set aside of city contracts for minority businesses (ten percent of the 
total amount of city contracts). See id. at 658. The Supreme Court struck down the 
policy, although it was not clear whether any of the plaintiffs would have received the 
contracts from bidding on the set asides. The Court recognized their interest in a fair 
process. See id. at 664-66. The Court labeled the process as the "opportunity to com­
pete." Id. at 666. 
334. Although this was not a problem for the Foundation, because foundations 
are tax exempt organizations, other donors might face such a tax problem. See supra 
Part III.A.3 for a discussion of the irrelevance of the tax issue to the Foundation. 
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This solution also protects donees because it should make do­
nors inclined to continue to make charitable donations, knowing 
that their wishes will be protected under CUMIFA. Limited stand­
ing does nothing to alter the common law of charitable trusts that 
still exists after CUMIFA's enactment, especially the rule that, once 
they make a completed gift, donors have no right to the gift itself 
unless reserved in the gift instrument.336 This solution also makes 
the gifts themselves more stable. That is because, although donors 
cannot use CUMIF A to enforce the gift itself, if they can be sure 
their wishes will be considered, they may not be inclined to include 
reversionary interests in the gift instrument.337 
CONCLUSION 
A donor who has made a completed gift to a charitable institu­
tion should have limited standing to sue under section 45a-533 of 
CUMIFA if the gift contains restrictions that the charitable institu­
tion has disregarded. In Carll. Herzog Foundation, Inc. v. Univer­
sity of Bridgeport, the Connecticut courts mischaracterized the 
donor's legal interest as an interest in the gift itself. The Connecti­
cut Supreme Court then held that donors have no standing to sue 
under CUMIFA. The supreme court's analysis has several weak­
nesses, including ignoring the plain language of the statute, relying 
on both questionable precedent and scant legislative history, and 
allowing the University to ignore the statute with impunity. 
The legal right CUMIFA gives donors is not a right to the gift 
itself, as the Connecticut courts stated. Instead, CUMIFA creates a 
legal interest in a process by which donees are able to alter the 
restrictions on charitable gifts. If a donee violates a donor's legally 
protected interest in the process, CUMIFA allows donors a right to 
sue, but the donor is limited to suing to enforce the process the 
statute outlines. Recasting the legal right CUMIFA creates for do­
nors is a compromise solution that addresses the concerns the Con­
necticut courts expressed. It protects donees by making the gifts 
they receive more stable. That stability is two-fold. First, donees 
would be free from the worry that donors who make completed 
charitable gifts will be able to use CUMIFA's provisions to revoke 
335. See supra Parts LA.3 and lILA for a discussion of tax issues in this case. 
336. See supra Part LA for a discussion of the common law of charitable trusts. 
337. See supra note 276 and accompanying text for a discussion of a practitioner's 
advice to insert reversionary interests in gift instruments. 
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gifts without warning.338 Second, when donors believe that 
CUMIFA protects their wishes, they may be less inclined to insert 
reversionary clauses into their gift instruments. Thus, donees can 
be assured that courts will try to find a way for them to keep gifts 
where the restrictions are obsolete. Recasting the legal right also 
protects against the tax concerns the Connecticut court expressed. 
Limited standing does not create donor control over the gift itself 
and tax deductions are thus protected. Finally, donors should gain 
satisfaction from the fact that donees will no longer be allowed to 
disregard the terms of CUMIFA with impunity. 
Paula Kilcoyne 
338. A reversionary clause in the gift instrument would provide such advance 
warning to donees. See supra note 6 for a discussion of reversionary clauses. 
